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 SUMMARY TABLE 
 2008 2009 2010(f)* 2011(f) 
 
OUTPUT 
 
(Real Annual Growth %)     
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.0 -7.2 - ¾ 1½ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 2.6 -1.2 -3 -2 
Investment -15.5 -29.7 -20¼ 2½ 
Exports -1.0 -2.3 2¼ 4½ 
Imports -2.1 -9.3 -1¼ 3½ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -3.0 -7.1 -½ 2½ 
Gross National Product (GNP) -2.8 -11.3 0 2¾ 
GNP per capita (constant prices) -4.6 -12.1 ¼ 2½ 
 
PRICES 
 
(Annual Growth %)     
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 3.3 -1.7 -1½ ½ 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 4.1 -4.5 ¼ 1¾ 
Wage Growth 3.5 -2.0 -3 -1 
 
LABOUR MARKET     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s))   2,100   1,929 1,856 1,857 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s))      141      258 294    280 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 6.3 11.8 13¾      13 
 
PUBLIC FINANCE     
Exchequer Balance (€bn) -12.7 -24.6 -20.2 -21.0 
General Government Balance (€bn) -13.3 -19.3 -19.3 -17.5 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -7.3 -11.8 -12 -10¾ 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 44.2 65.2 79 ¾ 89½ 
 
EXTERNAL TRADE     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -9.4 -4.9 0.7 2.0 
Current Account (% of GNP) -6.1 -3.7 ½ 1½ 
 
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES (end of year)     
US$/€ Exchange Rate 1.47 1.39 1.40 1.40 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate  0.79 0.89 0.87 0.86 
Main ECB Interest Rate  2.50 1.00 1.00 1.75 
   
 
* In the tables and text we present percentages (rates of change or percentage shares) of historical data 
to one decimal point. For our forecasts such percentages are presented as fractions rounded-off to the 
nearest quarter. This is to emphasise the distinction between historical data and forecast numbers. 
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SUMMARY 
For 2010, we expect GNP to be essentially unchanged from its 2009 volume; the 
corresponding figure for GDP is -½ per cent. Underlying these annual figures is a 
quarterly profile in which positive growth emerges during the year but not at a pace to 
return the annual figure to positive territory. For 2011, we expect GNP to grow by 2¾ per 
cent and GDP to grow by 2½ per cent. While this return to growth is to be welcomed, it 
should be seen as a modest pace of growth. 
 
We expect that the return to annual growth in 2011 will be led by exports, which we 
forecast to grow by 4½ per cent. This forecast is based in part on an expected acceleration 
in growth in the world economy in 2011. We also expect that Ireland will regain some of 
the competitiveness that was lost in the run up to the recession. Consumption is expected 
to fall by ¾ per cent in 2010 and then to grow again in 2011 at a rate of 1½ per cent. 
Investment is also expected to return to positive growth in 2011, with a growth rate of 2½ 
per cent forecast compared with an expected contraction of 20¼ per cent in 2010. 
 
We noted above that the forecast growth rate of 2½ per cent in 2011 should be seen as 
being modest. One manifestation of this is that employment is not expected to grow 
between 2010 and 2011. Instead, we expect the number employed to average close to 1.86 
million in both 2010 and 2011. In spite of the stability in the numbers employed, we expect 
unemployment to fall between 2010 and 2011, averaging 13¾ per cent in 2010 and 13 per 
cent in 2011. This expected fall in the rate of unemployment is related to expected 
migratory outflows – 60,000 in the year ending April 2010 and 40,000 in the year ending 
April 2011. We also expect to see on-going falls in labour force participation and this issue 
is discussed in some detail in a box on participation. 
 
We assume that the Government will implement its indicated budgetary package for 2011 
where spending cuts and tax increases will amount to €3 billion. When combined with a 
return to modest growth and the consequent impact on revenues, we expect to see the 
General Government Deficit falling to 10¾ per cent of GDP in 2011, down from 12 per 
cent in 2010.  
 
In our General Assessment, we refer back to a paper published by Institute researchers in 
May 20091 in which growth rates averaging around 5 per cent were shown to be possible in 
the period 2011 to 2015. It is still our view that such growth rates are attainable in the 
coming years. However, obstacles are still present which will see growth falling short of 
this in 2011. These obstacles include the on-going difficulties in the banking system which 
make it difficult to be optimistic about the capacity of the banking system to play an early 
role in facilitating the return to strong growth. In the context of banking, we note that the 
recapitalisation needs of the Irish banks are now likely to be at least €33 billion assuming 
that the State investment in Anglo Irish Bank ultimately amounts to €22 billion. We make 
two points in this context. First, while this will be a large addition to the national debt it is 
manageable and in no way threatens the solvency of the State. Second, the situation should 
never have arisen whereby the Irish taxpayer is faced with such a financial burden due to 
the behaviour of the private sector. 
 
1 Bergin et al., 2009. Recovery Scenarios for Ireland, ESRI Research Series No. 7, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2009 (Estimate) 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 93.9 84.2 -9.7 -6.7 -10.3 -3.4 -7.2 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.9 28.2 -0.7 -0.4 -2.4 -1.2 -1.2 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 39.5 25.5 -14.0 -11.7 -35.4 -8.1 -29.7 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 151.9 148.5 -3.4 -3.5 -2.3 0.0 -2.3 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.3 -2.8 -3.1 -3.3    
        
Final Demand 314.5 283.5 -31.0 -26.0 -9.8 -1.7 -8.3 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 133.0 120.3 -12.7 -12.3 -9.6 -0.3 -9.3 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.4 0.3 0.7 -0.8    
        
GDP at Market Prices 181.8 162.9 -18.9 -12.9 -10.4 -3.6 -7.1 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -27.2 -32.1 -4.9 -4.7 18.0 0.7 17.2 
        
GNP at Market Prices 154.6 130.8 -23.8 -17.5 -15.4 -4.6 -11.3 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.9 2.2 -0.7 -25.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 78.9 71.4 -7.5 -9.5 
  Other: 63.1 57.0 -6.1 -9.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 -0.2   
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.4 0.3   
     
Net Domestic Product 144.4 130.7 -13.6 -9.4 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -27.2 -32.1 -4.9 18.0 
     
National Income 117.1 98.6 -18.5 -15.8 
Depreciation 17.4 16.1 -1.4 -7.9 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 134.6 114.7 -19.9 -14.8 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.0 16.1 -3.9 -19.7 
     
GNP at Market Prices 154.6 130.8 -23.8 -15.4 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate  
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19 28 9 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27.2 -32.1 -4.9 
Net Transfers -1.1 -0.9 0.2 
    
Balance on Current Account -9.4 -4.9 4.6 
as % of GNP -6.1 -3.7 2.4 
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2008 2009 2009 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  0.6  
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 154.6 137.7 -16.9 -11.0 
GNDI* 153.5 136.7 -16.7 -10.9 
National Resources** 153.5 136.8 -16.8 -10.9 
* GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2010 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 84.2 82.5 -1.7 -0.7 -2 -1 ¼ - ¾ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.2 25.1 -3.1 -0.8 -11 -8 ¼ -3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 25.5 19.8 -5.7 -5.2 -22 ¼ -2 ½ -20 ¼ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 148.5 151.3 2.9 3.2 2 - ¼ 2 ¼ 
Physical Changes in Stocks -2.8 -0.1 2.7 2.2    
        
Final Demand 283.5 278.5 -4.9 -2.1 -1 ¾ -1 - ¾ 
less: 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120.3 118.3 -2.0 -1.5 -1 ¾ - ½ -1 ¼ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0    
        
GDP at Market Prices 162.9 159.9 -3.0 -0.6 -1 ¾ -1 ½ - ½ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -32.1 -31.4 0.7 0.6 -2 ¼ - ½ -1 ¾ 
        
GNP at Market Prices 130.8 128.5 -2.2 -0.1 -1 ¾ -1 ¾ 0 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.2 2.3 0.1 5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 71.4 66.9 -4.6 -6 ½ 
  Other: 57.0 58.9 1.9 3 ¼ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 -0.2   
 Statistical Discrepancy 0.3 0.3   
     
Net Domestic Product 130.7 128.2 -2.5 -2 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -32.1 -31.4 0.7 -2 ¼ 
     
National Income 98.6 96.8 -1.8 -1 ¾ 
Depreciation 16.1 16.0 -0.1 - ¼ 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 114.7 112.8 -1.9 -1 ¾ 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.1 15.7 -0.4 -2 ¼ 
     
GNP at Market Prices 130.8 128.5 -2.2 -1 ¾ 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 28.2 33.0 4.9 
Net Factor Payments (F) -32.1 -31.4 0.7 
Net Transfers -0.9 -0.9 0.0 
    
Balance on Current Account -4.9 0.7 5.6 
as % of GNP -3.7 0.6 4.3 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2009 2010 2010 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  0.3   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 130.8 131.0 0.2 ¼ 
GNDI* 129.9 130.1 0.2 ¼ 
National Resources** 129.9 130.1 0.2 ¼ 
* GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2011 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Forecast Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.5 84.5 2.1 1.2 2 ½ 1 1 ½ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.1 24.1 -1.0 -0.5 -4 -2 -2 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 19.8 20.2 0.4 0.5 2 - ½ 2 ½ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 151.3 159.3 8.0 6.7 5 ¼ ¾ 4 ½ 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0 0 0 
        
Final Demand 278.5 288.1 9.6 8.5 3 ½ ½ 3 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 118.3 123.7 5.4 4.2 4 ½ 1 3 ½ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1    
        
GDP at Market Prices 159.9 164.1 4.2 4.2 2 ½ 0 2 ½ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -31.4 -32.7 -1.3 -0.6 4 2 2 
        
GNP at Market Prices 128.5 131.4 2.9 3.5 2 ¼ - ½ 2 ¾ 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Forecast Forecast   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.3 2.4 0.1 5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 66.9 66.2 -0.6 -1 
  Other: 58.9 62.4 3.4 5¾ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0 
         Statistical .Discrepancy 0.3 0.3 0.0 0 
     
Net Domestic Product 128.2 131.1 2.9 2¼ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -31.4 -32.7 -1.3 4 
     
National Income 96.8 98.4 1.6 1¾ 
Depreciation 16.0 16.5 0.5 3 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 112.8 114.9 2.1 1¾ 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.7 16.5 0.8 5 
     
GNP at Market Prices 128.5 131.4 2.9 2¼ 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 33.0 35.6 2.6 
Net Factor Payments (F) -31.4 -32.7 -1.3 
Net Transfers 
 -0.9 -0.9 0.0 
Balance on Current Account    
as % of GNP 0.7 2.0 1.3 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2010 2011 2011 Volume Change 
  Estimate  
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -0.3   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 128.5 131.8 3.3 2½ 
GNDI* 127.6 130.9 3.3 2½ 
National Resources** 227.6 230.9 3.3 1½ 
* GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers.
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 THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
The global economy emerged from recession in the second quarter of 
2009 and recovered more strongly in the third and fourth quarters than 
previously anticipated, prompting a number of international forecasters to 
revise their growth projections upward. The UK’s National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (NIESR) now expects the world economy 
to expand by 3.6 per cent this year, followed by 3.9 per cent in 2011. 
However, the global recovery is proceeding at a different pace across the 
various regions, and this projected expansion in 2010 and 2011 reflects the 
current expectations of relatively vigorous activity in many of the emerging 
economies. By contrast, the recovery in most advanced economies is 
expected to be gradual, and this is reflected in the NIESR growth forecasts 
for OECD countries of 1.9 per cent and 2.3 per cent in 2010 and 2011 
respectively. 
 
Even among the advanced economies, a multi-speed recovery process 
appears to be under way. The US economy came out of recession in the 
third quarter of 2009 and grew at an annual rate of 5.6 per cent in the 
fourth quarter.2 This was its strongest quarterly performance in the last six 
years, and while much of this impressive fourth quarter growth was fuelled 
by businesses easing the pace at which they reduced inventories, both 
consumer spending and spending on residential construction rose during 
this period. The US economy also appears to have made a positive start to 
2010. Strong retail sales figures from January and February provided a 
further boost to recovery hopes, although the data from March showed a 
small month-on-month decline.  Industrial output rose in February for the 
eighth consecutive month and was up by 1.7 per cent compared to 
February 2009. Overall, the US economy is expected to register growth of 
2.4 per cent this year, and 2.6 per cent in 2011. 
 
In contrast, the Euro Area recovery lost momentum in the final months 
of 2009 and quarter-on-quarter growth in Q4 was flat. A strong 
performance by France failed to offset contractions in Italy and Spain while 
German growth in the fourth quarter was also flat, with consumption, 
government spending and investment all falling. The latest indicators 
suggest that there has been little improvement in the early stages of 2010 
and NIESR is forecasting growth of just 1.0 per cent this year, followed by 
growth of 1.7 per cent in 2011.  
 
2 This is the third and most recent estimate of fourth quarter US GDP. 
Main 
Developments 
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The economic challenges facing the Euro Area are undoubtedly being 
compounded by the public finances situation in a number of member states 
and in particular by the on-going debt crisis in Greece. The magnitude of 
the Greek deficit combined with its existing national debt, estimated to be 
about 110 per cent of GDP, has resulted in widespread market concerns 
that have spilled over to a number of peripheral member states. After much 
debate, Euro Area leaders finally agreed on a rescue package at the end of 
March, consisting of a joint mechanism of coordinated bilateral loans from 
the other 15 member states as well as IMF assistance. According to this 
agreement, the rescue package will only be triggered in the event that 
Greece is unable to secure sufficient market financing. While the Greek 
government is still expected to execute its own fiscal consolidation 
programme in order to restore stability to its public finances, it is hoped 
that the announcement of a rescue package will ease the pressure on 
Greece in the international financial markets.  
 
The UK has also experienced a slow start to its recovery, registering 
quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.4 per cent in the final three months of 
2009. Domestic factors continue to act as a drag on growth, with ongoing 
weakness in consumption and investment apparent from the fourth quarter 
figures. In addition, figures from the Bank of England show that lending to 
private companies in February was 4.1 per cent lower than in February 
2009, suggesting continued weakness in the supply of credit to businesses. 
Meanwhile, in spite of a weakened pound, the UK’s trade deficit in January 
was at its widest since August 2008 as exports dropped sharply. NIESR 
remains optimistic, however, that strong world trade growth and the 
competitiveness gains from the depreciation of sterling will result in a sharp 
increase in export volumes in 2010 and 2011. Overall, the UK economy is 
expected to grow by 1.1 per cent in 2010 and by 2.0 per cent in 2011. As 
shown in Table 1, the UK is forecast to have the largest public deficit of 
the major economies in 2010 and with a general election looming next 
month, tackling this deficit will be one of the first major priorities of the 
new government.  
 
As discussed in previous Commentaries, there are potential downside risks 
to these forecasts, particularly in Europe where the recovery appears to be 
considerably more fragile. Financial market conditions have undoubtedly 
improved, with signs of stabilisation in money markets and a rebound in 
equity markets. Nonetheless, there remains a concern that the outstanding 
impairments in financial systems and in housing markets, together with 
rising unemployment levels, may impede the recovery in household 
spending to a greater extent than currently expected. In addition, much of 
the rebound in global economic activity has been driven by the 
extraordinary policy stimuli and there are still few indications that 
autonomous private demand is taking hold in the advanced economies. 
One of the key risks is that a premature termination of supportive policies 
may undermine the recovery. On the other hand, concerns about rising 
public debt and medium-term fiscal sustainability in many advanced 
economies could potentially derail the recovery process by unsettling 
financial markets and increasing the cost of borrowing, thereby crowding 
 7 
out private consumption and investment. Designing the appropriate exit 
strategies from the exceptional policy measures introduced during the 
economic crisis will be one of the main priorities for governments and 
policymakers over the coming year. 
 
On a related note, the commitments to restoring fiscal discipline and to 
credible fiscal policy over the medium term are among the key factors that 
are likely to determine the pace of recovery in Euro Area countries. The 
Greek experience in the government bond markets over the last few 
months demonstrates clearly how a lack of credible fiscal strategy rapidly 
affects investor confidence. Figure 1 shows the yield spread between 
German ten-year government bonds and the Greek and Irish equivalents. 
Greek bond yields have fluctuated widely since the beginning of the year, 
and as concerns regarding the fiscal position escalated in late January, the 
spread on the Greek ten-year government bond yield over the German 
equivalent rose sharply to almost 400 basis points – its highest level since 
Greece joined the Euro Area in 2001. In contrast, the Irish bond spread 
vis-à-vis Germany narrowed significantly towards the end of 2009 in the 
wake of government actions aimed at stabilising the deficit and, although 
partly hit by a Greek spillover effect in February, the spread has remained 
relatively stable at under 150 basis points throughout the first three months 
of the year. However, the Greek experience should serve as a reminder to 
Ireland of the crucial importance of an ongoing commitment to fiscal 
sustainability. 
Figure 1: Ten Year Government Bond Spreads, Jan 2008-March 2010 
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EXPORTS 
As mentioned in previous Commentaries, Irish exports proved to be relatively 
resilient during the recession and the magnitude of decline was much less 
severe than that experienced by many other advanced economies. This is 
discussed further in the Exports section and Figure 13 highlights the 
superior performance of Irish exports over the past year, relative to the 
performance of Euro Area exports. While Euro Area exports declined by 
Implications 
for Ireland 
  8 
13.2 per cent in volume last year, Irish exports contracted by just 2.3 per 
cent. This relatively resilient performance is largely due to the composition 
of Irish exports and in particular the importance of pharmaceutical 
products and chemicals, which proved to be somewhat recession proof. 
Figure 2: Index of World Trade, 2008-2009 
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Collapse of Lehman Brothers
 
 
Looking ahead, the outlook for Irish exports over the forecast horizon 
depends crucially on the international recovery and on the recovery in 
world trade, which collapsed dramatically towards the end of 2008. As 
shown in Figure 2, world merchandise trade has picked up significantly in 
recent months, and at the end of 2009 was almost back to its level prior to 
the Lehman Brothers collapse. Our future export performance also 
depends on the extent to which Ireland can regain competitiveness relative 
to other countries and on this issue it is difficult to know how much 
progress has been made thus far. We do know that there have been 
significant wage reductions in the public sector and although we do not yet 
have a clear picture of private sector wage developments for 2009, we have 
estimated that an economy-wide wage reduction of 2.0 per cent occurred 
last year. NIESR has estimated a 1.1 per cent increase in average earnings 
in the Euro Area in 2009 and its forecasts for 2010 and 2011 imply further 
increases of 2.3 per cent in each year. Combined with our own forecasts for 
further wage reductions this year and next, Ireland should expect to make 
some competitiveness gains in this area. In addition, Ireland experienced a 
significant reduction in consumer prices in 2009. Our forecasts suggest that 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) inflation in Ireland will 
remain below the level of Euro Area inflation in both 2010 and 2011, 
having been consistently higher prior to 2008 as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Irish and Euro Area HICP Inflation Rates 
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EXCHANGE RATES 
Related to the issue of competitiveness and the outlook for Irish exports 
are the expected developments in bilateral exchange rates. As with all the 
international numbers quoted in this Commentary, the exchange rates are 
taken from the most recent NIESR Economic Review.3 These exchange rates 
are presented by NIESR as “forecast assumptions” and their current 
assumptions imply that the STG/EUR exchange rate will average 0.87 in 
2010 and 0.86 in 2011, while the USD/EUR exchange rate will average 
1.40 in both years. The NIESR view regarding 2010 exchange rates has 
changed considerably since our last Commentary. At that time, the assumed 
STG/EUR and USD/EUR rates for 2010 were 0.90 and 1.49 respectively. 
 
The euro fell sharply at the beginning of 2010, largely due to concerns 
about Euro Area sovereign ratings, and in particular the fiscal difficulties 
facing Greece. Expected growth differentials are also playing a role and the 
expectation that Euro Area growth will remain relatively subdued in 2010 is 
maintaining the downward pressure on the euro. Meanwhile the dollar 
rallied in the first three months of 2010, on the back of encouraging US 
data and an improved economic outlook. The euro is now expected to 
average $1.40 in 2010, considerably lower than the $1.49 that was 
previously assumed. 
 
3 NIESR Economic Review, No. 211, January 2010. 
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 Table 1: Short-term International Outlook 
 
      
 GDP Output Growth Consumer Prices* 
Inflation 
Unemployment Rate General Government 
Balance 
Government Debt 
 % % % % of GDP % of GDP 
      
Country 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
                
UK -4.8 1.1 2.0 2.2 2.9 1.7 7.6 8.7 9.2 -11.9 -13.2 -11.5 68.4 78.3 85.8 
Germany -5.0 1.7 1.9 0.2 0.9 1.0 7.6 8.4 8.4 -3.4 -5.9 -5.8 74.1 79.2 83.6 
France -2.2 1.4 1.7 0.1 1.3 1.3 9.4 10.0 9.8 -8.3 -8.3 -7.7 77.2 83.7 88.9 
Italy -4.8 0.9 1.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 7.7 8.5 8.7 -5.4 -5.2 -4.9 114.2 117.8 120.2 
                
Euro Area -3.9 1.0 1.7 0.3 1.3 1.1 9.4 10.3 10.3 -6.4 -7.0 -6.3    
USA -2.6 2.4 2.6 0.2 2.0 2.3 9.2 9.6 9.1 -11.1 -10.9 -8.8 82.8 89.7 93.6 
Japan -5.4 0.8 1.8 -2.0 -0.4 1.1 5.1 5.4 5.2 -8.0 -10.0 -9.7 192.4 197.2 199.0 
China 8.7 8.5 9.0 5.9 -0.1 0.6 9.8 7.8 8.6       
                
OECD -3.4 1.9 2.3 0.4 1.7 1.9          
                
Ireland -7     - ½ 2 ½ -1 ¾ -1 ½  ½ 11 ¾ 13 ¾ 13    -11 ¾ -12     -10 ¾ 65.2 79 ¾ 89 ½ 
                
Source: NIESR, Economic Review, No. 211, January 2010. 
*HICP for EU countries, consumption deflator for rest of world. 
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Sterling has been severely impacted since the onset of the financial 
crisis. The weak economic performance in the UK, combined with the very 
loose nature of monetary policy and the UK’s perceived exposure to the 
financial sector, have all contributed to a weak pound. Sterling started 2010 
on a strong note, but has come under increasing pressure of late, largely 
related to the uncertainty ahead of the general election and the concerns 
about the impact a hung parliament may have on the political ability to 
tackle the fiscal deficit. The UK is forecast to have one of the highest 
deficits in Europe in 2010 and is currently without any firm medium-term 
plan to get the public finances back to a sustainable level. In spite of this, 
the on-going fiscal difficulties in Euro Area countries and their impact on 
the single currency have resulted in a downward revision to expectations 
regarding the STG/EUR exchange rate relative to our last Commentary. The 
euro is now expected to average £0.87 in 2010 and £0.86 in 2011. 
Figure 4: Exchange Rates 
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INTEREST RATES 
The ECB has cut interest rates by a cumulative 325 basis points since 
October 2008, bringing the official rate to an historic low of 1.0 per cent. 
The consensus seems to be that we have reached the bottom of the current 
cycle, now that the Euro Area economy has technically emerged from 
recession. However, the ECB has repeatedly stated that the refinancing rate 
is at an appropriate level, suggesting that it is very much on hold for the 
foreseeable future. The current NIESR forecasts suggest a HICP inflation 
rate of 1.3 per cent in the Euro Area in 2010. Given the anaemic growth 
prospects for the Euro Area and the absence of any significant inflationary 
pressures, it seems unlikely that the ECB will consider raising interest rates 
until early 2011. Therefore, our forecasts are based on the assumption that 
the refinancing rate will be 1.0 per cent at the end of 2010, rising to 1.75 
per cent by the end of 2011. From an Irish perspective, an unchanged rate 
in 2010 would certainly be welcomed, given the particularly fragile nature 
of the economic recovery here. In previous Commentaries we have expressed 
a concern about the possibility of interest rate increases occurring at a time 
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when the Euro Area recovery is well under way, but when the activity in 
Ireland remains relatively subdued.  
 
We have also previously highlighted the possibility that mortgage 
interest rates in Ireland may increase in 2010, even in the absence of an 
ECB rate hike. Prior to the financial crisis, Irish interest rate margins were 
low by international standards and they have declined further since the 
onset of the crisis. In the last two months, both AIB and permanent tsb have 
announced a 50bps increase in their standard variable mortgage rate and it 
appears likely that these are the first of a number of increases to come in 
the months ahead. We have factored this in to our assumptions regarding 
future interest rates, as shown in Figure 5. It should be noted from Figure 5 
that in spite of the expected significant increase in nominal interest rates 
over the forecast horizon, our expectations regarding inflation imply an 
overall reduction in the real interest rate, relative to its current level. 
Figure 5: Interest Rates 
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THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
In this Quarterly Economic Commentary we provide our first forecasts of 
economic prospects for the economy in 2011. Following a further small 
contraction in the economy in 2010 we expect growth to resume in 2011 
with both GDP and GNP growing by 2½ per cent. These forecasts are 
based on the expectation among international forecasters that growth in 
the world economy will recover during 2010, picking up further in 2011. 
The pick-up in world growth in 2010 is reflected in a significant 
improvement in external demand. However we expect domestic demand to 
contract further this year, driven both by a large contraction in investment 
of over 20 per cent and a decline in both private and public consumption 
as a result of the cuts of €4 billion implemented in Budget 2010. In 2011 
we expect the collapse in investment to bottom out and, together with a 
further increase in external demand, this should be sufficient to see a 
modest resumption of growth.  
 
Our first estimates suggest that the pre-announced budgetary cuts of €3 
billion in 2011 could reduce the growth rate by up to one percentage point.  
We estimate that these measures could reduce the General Government 
Deficit by two percentage points of GDP in 2011. In relation to the labour 
market, our forecast of unemployment for 2010 is largely unchanged from 
the previous Commentary at 13¾ per cent, in 2011 we expect this rate to fall 
to 13 per cent. However, it is important to stress that as we expect no 
change in the average level of employment in 2011, the fall in the 
unemployment rate is rather due to a fall in labour supply driven by falling 
participation rates and net migration outflows. 
 
Prices have fallen rapidly in 2009 and this has had a significant impact 
on the measured size of the economy. In value terms, national income as 
measured by either GDP or GNP has fallen even more rapidly than in 
volume terms. The most recent Quarterly National Accounts for the final 
quarter of 2009 estimate that volume GNP fell by over 11 per cent, 
however in value terms GNP fell by over 15 per cent. From a peak in 2007 
Q1, the value of GNP had fallen by one quarter by 2009 Q4. Figure 6 
shows the most recent quarterly data on GDP and GNP in current prices, 
indicating that by the last quarter of 2009 GNP had fallen to levels last 
recorded in 2004 Q1 (for GDP 2005 Q1).  
 
  14 
Figure 6: GDP and GNP at Current Prices, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Table 2 shows the implied carryover from the latest QNA data, in other 
words what the volume growth rate across the main expenditure headings 
would be in 2010 on the assumption of no further change in levels 
throughout the year. Contrasting this with the QEC forecast for 2010 gives 
an overview of our forecast changes for 2010. Looking first at private 
consumption, the implied carryover is -0.4; our forecast of a bigger fall of -
1 per cent reflects the impact of the most recent budgetary cuts on 
consumption behaviour, especially in the first half of the year. The same 
applies for public consumption, where we forecast a fall of 3 per cent, 
much larger than the implied carryover of -1.6. In relation to investment, 
we expect a fall of over 20 per cent, relative to a carryover rate of 12 per 
cent; this reflects a further large contraction in the building and 
construction sector. It is in the external sector that we expect an 
improvement relative to 2009, with exports expected to grow by 2¼ per 
cent relative to carryover of -0.2. This is due to both the improved world 
environment in 2010 and the gradual improvement in competitiveness. For 
imports we expect a further contraction in 2010 of -1¼ per cent, while this 
is higher than the implied carryover rate of -2.4, it is relatively subdued due 
to the further contraction in private consumption. 
Table 2: Implied Carryover (% change) 
    
 Estimate Carryover 
QEC 
Forecast 
 2009 2010 2010 2011 
Private Consumer Expenditure -7.2 -0.4 -0.9 1.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure -1.2 -1.6 -3.0 -2.0 
Private Investment -29.7 -12.3 -20.3 2.6 
Exports -2.3 -0.2 2.2 4.5 
Imports -9.3 -2.4 -1.2 3.6 
GDP at market prices -7.1 -1.9 -0.4 2.6 
GNP at market prices -11.3 -3.0 -0.1 2.7 
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Our forecasts for 2011 assume a continuation of gains in 
competitiveness, through further falls in wages and very subdued price 
increases. We also assume that the fiscal package of €3 billion in cuts for 
2011 indicated by the Government will be fully implemented. This may 
well prove difficult to achieve: it will involve further increases in average 
tax levels, cuts in current expenditure programmes and further cuts in the 
capital programme. Allied to these two key assumptions, and assuming the 
international forecasts for world growth prove correct, is a maintained 
assumption that the measures currently being undertaken to address the 
serious problems in the Irish banking system will be successful in restoring 
confidence and credit flows. Were one or more of these assumptions to 
prove incorrect then there is a danger in the short term that this could lead 
to an increase in the cost of borrowing for the Exchequer, exacerbating the 
scale of the fiscal correction needed. In the medium term this would mean 
that the economy could underperform relative to its potential. 
 
 The Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) for Q4 2009 show that the volume 
of consumption spending fell by 7.2 per cent in 2009. In Figure 7, we show 
the quarter-on-quarter growth rates (seasonally adjusted) which underlie 
this annual figure, along with the corresponding growth rates for 2008. The 
figure indicates that the annual decline resulted from particularly sharp 
declines in Q4 2008 and Q1 2009 and then some stabilisation in the latter 
part of the year. 
Figure 7: Quarter-on-Quarter % Change in Volume of Consumption, 
Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts,  CSO.  
 
This pattern of consumption decline is also evident in Table 3 where we 
show a range of recent indicators of changes in consumption. The biggest 
changes across the quarters in annual rates of decline are generally seen in 
late 2008 and early 2009. Looking at the “all businesses” column under 
retail sales, we can see that the annual rate of decline had essentially 
stabilised between Q3 2009 and Q4 2009. A similar point can be made in 
Consumption 
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respect of car sales, both the “new” and “all” categories. The data from the 
January retail sales index shows that the annual rate of decline has 
moderated to 12.2 per cent. 
Table 3: Recent Indicators of Consumption (Annualised Volume Growth 
Rates) 
     
 Retail Sales (Unadjusted) 
Trips 
Abroad 
New Vehicle 
Sales 
All Vehicle 
Sales 
 
All 
Businesses 
Excl. Motor 
Trade    
2008Q1 4.6 6.0 11.6 -1.5 -2.6 
2008Q2 0.6 3.6 8.3 -10.3 -13.7 
2008Q3 -2.7 0.8 6.2 -12.8 -18.0 
2008Q4 -6.0 -2.7 2.1 -15.4 -20.9 
2009Q1 -11.6 -5.3 -3.1 -31.9 -44.7 
2009Q2 -13.4 -6.6 -5.0 -37.3 -53.3 
2009Q3 -14.3 -6.9 -9.6 -46.1 -62.2 
2009Q4 -14.2 -6.8 -10.5 -47.1 -62.5 
      
Source: CSO. 
 
A further insight into recent trends under this heading is provided by 
the KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. Figure 8 shows that the index 
fell below 50 in June of 2008 (on a 3 month moving average basis) and 
remained below 50 up to August of 2009. Since then, it has been on an 
upward trend indicating a growing degree of confidence. This in turn is 
likely to have been related to slowing pace of growth in unemployment in 
the latter part of 2010. 
Figure 8: Consumer Sentiment Index (3 Month Moving Average) 
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Turning to our forecasts, we expect consumption to fall by ¾ per cent 
in 2010. Since the carry-over from 2009 is estimated at 0.4 per cent, our 
forecast for a steeper decline arises from our expectation of further 
declines in 2010 as a result of wages cuts, welfare cuts and on-going job 
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losses. Following the general outlook in our forecasts, our quarterly profile 
sees the falls in consumption occurring in the first two quarters followed by 
stabilisation in the latter part of the year.  
 
For 2011, we expect consumption to grow by 1½ per cent. The 
forecasts for consumption growth in 2010 and 2011 are consistent with the 
savings rate falling minimally between 2009 and 2011, from 10.6 in 2009 to 
10¼ in 2011. If consumer confidence returned with greater strength and 
more quickly than we anticipate the possibility remains of stronger growth 
in consumption. In Figure 9, we show the saving rate going back to 1990, 
along with our forecasts for 2010 and 2011. Over the period 1990 to 2009, 
the savings rate averaged 7.5 per cent. From 2000 to 2009, it averaged 6.5 
per cent. Each one percentage point fall in the savings rate amounts to a 
consumption increase of almost €1 billion. Hence, a return to the 2000-
2009 average would amount to a significant spending boost. But with no 
employment growth envisaged in 2011 and on-going concerns about access 
to credit for consumers, our cautious stance on this seems appropriate.  
Figure 9: Savings Rate (Personal Savings Relative to Disposable Income) 
1990-2009, Forecasts for 2010 and 2011 
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Source: CSO and own calculations.  
 
 The QNA for Q4 2009 show that the volume of investment spending fell 
by 29.7 per cent in 2009. This figure was made up of a fall of 33.8 per cent 
in building and 15.7 per cent in machinery and equipment. Looking at 
Figure 10, it can be seen that, as was the case with consumption spending, 
the Q4 2008 and Q1 2009 quarter-on-quarter declines were particularly 
steep. However, the quarter-on-quarter declines in consumption were less 
than 1 per cent in Q3 and Q4 of 2009, compared to the falls in the case of 
investment which were in the region of 10 per cent. 
 
Investment 
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Table 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
        
 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Housing 15.1 -38.3 -49.1 7.7 -39     -41 ¼ 4.5 5     2     4.6 
           
Other Building 13.2 -25.3 -30.5 9.2 -15     -21     7.3 -5 ½ -8 ¼ 6.6 
           
Transfer Costs 1.7 -61.2 -68.8 0.5 -15     -20     0.4 10     10     0.5 
           
Building and   
Construction 30.0 -33.8 -42.0 17.4 -26     -30     12.2 -1     -4     11.7 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment 9.5 -15.7 -14.7 8.1 -5     -6     7.6 10     11 ¾ 8.5 
           
Total 39.5 -29.7 -35.4 25.5 -20 ¼ -22 ¼ 19.8 2 ½ 2     20.2 
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Figure 10: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth in the Volume of Investment 
Spending (Seasonally Adjusted), Q1 2008 to Q4 2009 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts,  CSO.  
 
In Figure 11, we look at statistics on housing output and the trend that 
has become so familiar since 2007 remains. Housing commencements in 
the year ending Q4 2009 were 8,552, with registrations running at 3,743. 
Completions for the year 2009 were 26,420, while planning permissions 
amounted to 40,556. The level of completions, at over 26,000, exceeded 
the expectations which we held at the start of 2009. In the Commentary of 
Spring 2009, we had forecast completions of 17,500 for 2009, followed by 
15,000 in 2010. Given that the speed of decline in 2009 was lower than we 
had expected, we now think that housing completions will be 10,000 in 
2010 and so the contraction in housing activity will remain a drag on the 
economy in 2010. For 2011, we expect completions to be stable at 10,000 
units. Hence, although the housing contraction will no longer be a drag on 
growth, neither will this sector contribute to growth in 2011. On prices, the 
permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index shows that prices had declined by 
31.5 per cent between their peak in early 2007 and December 2009.4 The 
decline in December, at 3.6 per cent, was higher than the declines in the 
preceding three months and so the pace of decline showed no signs of 
moderating. Our forecasts are based on new house prices being 50 per cent 
below their peak by the end of 2011, with prices stabilising during the 
course of 2011. 
 
 
4 Due to the low volume of transactions, the Index is now being produced on a quarterly 
basis and not a monthly basis as had been the case. 
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Figure 11: Housing Statistics, Annualised numbers 
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We expect the volume of total investment to fall by 20¼ per cent in 
2010. Underlying this is a fall in housing investment volume of 39 per cent, 
a fall of 15 per cent in other building and a fall in investment in machinery 
and equipment of 5 per cent. For 2011, we expect to see a return to growth 
in investment spending driven mainly by investment in machinery and 
equipment. Following substantial falls in this component beginning in 
2008, we would expect some turnaround and our forecast for 2011 is for 
volume growth of 10 per cent. Housing is shown in Table 4 to expand in 
2011 but the growth is assumed to be in repair and renovation as opposed 
to an increase in housing unit completions relative to 2010. Other building 
and construction is forecast to fall in 2011, partly as a result of an assumed 
fall of €1 billion in capital spending by the government. Further details on 
this element are provided in the next section. 
 
 The most recent exchequer returns for the first three months of 2010 
show a continued decline in total exchequer tax receipts. Total tax revenue 
in March 2010 was €1.3 billion lower than in the same period in 2009. This 
continued deterioration in tax revenue meant that the exchequer deficit in 
March 2010 widened despite a fall of over €1 billion in voted expenditures 
(see Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government 
Spending 
and Public 
Finances 
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Table 5: Exchequer Returns  
      
 
March 
2008 Change 
March 
2009 Change 
March 
2010 
 €bn €bn % €bn €bn % €bn 
Total Receipts 12.5 -3.1 -25 9.4 -1.2 -13 8.2 
of which        
Tax Revenue 11.1 -2.6 -23 8.5 -1.3 -15 7.2 
        
Excise 1.4 -0.4 -32 0.9 0.0 -2 0.9 
Capital Gains 
Tax. 0.5 -0.4 -70 0.2 -0.1 -35 0.1 
Stamps 0.5 -0.3 -62 0.2 -0.1 -29 0.1 
Income Tax 3.1 -0.2 -7 2.9 -0.3 -10 2.6 
Corporation 
Tax 0.8 -0.4 -44 0.5 -0.3 -74 0.1 
VAT 4.5 -0.8 -18 3.7 -0.5 -13 3.2 
        
Total 
Expenditure 12.8 0.4 3 13.2 -1.1 -8 12.1 
of which:        
Voted Capital 1.6 -0.1 -6 1.5 -0.5 -31 1.0 
Voted Current 9.6 0.8 8 10.3 -0.6 -6 9.7 
        
Exchequer 
Balance -0.4 -3.4  -3.7 -0.2  -3.9 
        
 
 
Table 6: Public Finances  
        
 2008  
€bn 
% 
Change 
2009 
€bn 
% 
Change 
2010 
€bn 
% 
Change 
    2011 
€bn 
        
Current Revenue 41.6 -18.6 33.9  ¼ 34.0 - ¼ 33.9 
   of which: Tax Revenue 40.8 -19.0 33.0 -4 ¼ 31.6 3 ½ 32.8 
Current Expenditure 44.7 1.2 45.2 4 ¼ 47.1 3 ¼ 48.7 
   of which: Voted 40.8 -1.2 40.3 - ¼ 40.2  ½ 40.4 
            
Current Surplus -3.1  -11.4  -13.2  -14.8 
            
Capital Receipts 1.4 4.8 1.5 14 ¼ 1.7 -2 ½ 1.6 
Capital Expenditure 11.0 33.5 14.7 -40 ¾ 8.7 -10 ¼ 7.8 
   of which: Voted 8.6 -19.3 6.9 -14 ½ 5.9 -15     5.0 
            
Capital Borrowing -9.6  -13.3  -7.1  -6.2 
            
Exchequer Balance -12.7  -24.6  -20.2  -21.0 
 as % of GNP -8.2  -18.8  -15 ¾  -16     
            
General Government 
Balance* -13.3  -19.3  -19.3  -17.5 
 as % of GDP -7.3  -11.8  -12      -10 ¾ 
            
Gross Debt as % of GDP 44.2  65.2  79 ¾  89 ½ 
            
Net Debt as % of GDP** 33.6  51.5  50 ½  59 ¾ 
        
*2010 and 2011 figures are based on National Accounts estimates. 
**Net of NPRF, Social Insurance and Exchequer Balances. 
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Table 5 shows the changes in the key tax headings over the past two 
years. Total tax revenue in March 2010 was almost €4 billion lower than in 
March 2008. One-third of this decline, €1.3 billion, was due to a fall in 
VAT receipts, one-fifth, €0.7 billion, was due to a fall in corporation tax, 
while €0.5 billion was due to lower income taxes. Looking at the changes 
over the past two years, the pace of decline has slowed for most of the 
indirect tax heads in 2010, however the pace of decline in income taxes has 
accelerated.  Figure 12 shows the rolling annual total between December 
2005 and March 2010. It confirms the continued downward trend which 
began in the middle of 2007.  For the year ended March 2010, total tax 
revenue was just below €32 billion, a fall of €15 billion from the peak in 
October 2007.  
 
Figure 12: Total Exchequer Tax Revenues, Rolling Annual Total5 
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 Our forecast of tax revenue for 2010 is for an overall decline of 4¼ per 
cent. This is equivalent to a full-year tax take of €31½  billion This is based 
on a pick-up in growth in the second half of this year which should be 
sufficient to stabilise the current rapid pace of decline. If this forecast 
proves correct, and assuming budgetary targets for current and capital 
expenditure are met, then we estimate that the General Government 
Balance will be -12 per cent of GDP in 2010. For 2011 we have 
implemented a stylised budget based on the pre-announced targets 
included in Budget 2010. In the document these include total cuts of €3 
billion, with €2 billion targeted at the current side of the budget and a €1 
billion reduction in capital expenditure. To operationalise this budget we 
have assumed an increase in €1 billion in taxation, split between increases 
in income tax (including PRSI) and some form of property taxation. On 
current expenditure we have assumed a freeze in welfare payments and 
public sector pay rates together with further reductions in the volume of 
 
5 There is a discrete shift in November in each year. This reflects the impact of collection 
of capital gains tax and corporation tax, which are both concentrated at this time of year. 
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public consumption which is forecast to fall by 2 per cent in 2011. It is 
important to stress that this is not a prescriptive recommendation; we have 
implemented these measures to estimate the impact of the pre-announced 
budget plans on the public finances and the wider economy. 
 
We estimate that such a budget package would reduce the General 
Government Deficit by between 1½ and 2 percentage points of GDP.6 
The impact on the wider economy is to reduce the growth rate by 
approximately one percentage point.7 In addition, the level of employment 
is lower and emigration flows higher than in the absence of such a package. 
These are real costs attached to the programme of fiscal consolidation 
being pursued by the government. Despite these costs it is the view of this 
Commentary that such measures are necessary to ensure the medium-term 
sustainability of the public finances. Given the range of measures which 
have already been introduced, the 2011 budget is likely to involve some 
very difficult choices. While there are likely to be significant cost savings to 
be made in the capital programme which should mitigate the effects of the 
cuts on the levels of volume investment, it is nevertheless the case that by 
2011 public investment levels in current prices will be one-third lower than 
in 2008. Implementing further cuts in current expenditure and increases in 
taxation will also be challenging. In this context the measures proposed in 
the recent Commission on Taxation report and the Bord Snip Nua report 
could help ensure that these choices are made within a coherent framework 
of medium-term reform of the public sector and the taxation system. 
 
The recently announced plans for providing support to the banking 
system involve very significant increases in the level of government 
involvement in the financial sector. It is very difficult to put exact figures 
on the level of government monies involved. However, a tentative estimate 
of the order of €73 billion, 8 equivalent to 47 per cent of GDP in 2010, can 
provide a guideline. These numbers are discussed in more detail later in the 
section on the monetary sector.. Of course these are gross figures and 
much of this liability is matched by assets both within NAMA and in AIB 
and Bank of Ireland. Nevertheless, it is possible that the net cost to the 
taxpayer of this support to the banking system, based on the latest figures 
available, will be of the order of €25 billion or more. 
 
For 2010 and 2011, we have assumed that the Government will borrow 
€2 billion in each year to fund the recapitalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and 
INBS. This increases the exchequer deficit in both years by €2 billion, but it 
does not appear in the estimate of the General Government Deficit. In 
 
6 The figures presented here show a gap of 1½, this is because we have assumed that the 
€20 billion in promissory notes which is to be used to recapitalise Anglo Irish Bank and 
INBS, will be issued over a ten-year period in equal amounts. This increases the interest 
payments due in calculating the General Government Deficit, with a maintained 
assumption that there will be no counterparty receipts. 
7 This estimate is based on comparing the “with budget” forecasts presented in this 
Commentary with the forecast growth rates which would arise given a neutral budget.  
8 This figure includes an estimated €40 billion investment in NAMA, €7 billion to Allied 
Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland, and an estimated €26 billion to Anglo Irish Bank, EBS 
and INBS. 
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doing this we are following the official statistical guidelines which treat 
monies put into Anglo Irish Bank as an investment by the State. The 
interest cost of this extra borrowing is included in the General 
Government Deficit, with a maintained assumption that there will be no 
counterparty return on these “investments”. Because of this payment, our 
figure for gross government debt in 2011 is €4 billion higher, equivalent to 
over 2 per cent of GDP. We are assuming that this will also increase the 
net debt by the same amount.  
 
Given the very large liabilities which the State has now taken on through 
transfers to NAMA and other funding for the banking system, it would be 
useful to have a consolidated balance sheet for the General Government 
Sector. We believe there is now a real need to develop such a balance sheet. 
This would help clarify the net liabilities of the Government in relation to 
the banking system and track these over time. 
 
 The performance of Irish exports given the collapse in world trade which 
accompanied the global economic downturn, represents one of the few 
encouraging signs to emerge from the Irish economy in 2009. The Quarterly 
National Accounts for Q4 2009 indicate a fall in the volume of total exports 
in 2009 of 2.3 per cent. Consistent with the trend over the previous 3 
quarters of 2009, exports of goods and services (seasonally adjusted) held 
up in the final quarter of 2009 with a small volume increase of 0.1 per cent 
recorded compared to Q3.  
 
Turning to the components of total exports, the latest data show a fall in 
merchandise exports of 5.4 per cent in 2009 compared to the previous year. 
While this decline illustrates that Irish merchandise exports were not 
immune to the contraction in world demand in 2009, the resilience of Irish 
merchandise exports in comparison to the large declines in exports 
experienced in our major trading partners is notable (Figure 13). Much of 
this resilience is due to the concentration of Irish exports in sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals which have been less adversely affected by the downturn 
in the international economy than sectors such as machinery and transport. 
Exports of chemicals and related products (mostly medical and 
pharmaceutical products and organic chemicals), which accounted for over 
half of the value of total merchandise exports in 2009, grew by 6.8 per cent 
compared to 2008 according to the latest External Trade statistics. The 
strong performance of chemicals exports helped to offset some of the 
decline in exports experienced in other sectors of the economy. Exports of 
electrical machinery and computers fell by 30 per cent compared to 2008.  
Exports of goods from the traditional sector of the economy also declined 
reflecting the difficult trading conditions created by the weakness of 
sterling and contraction in the UK economy. 
Exports 
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Table 7: Exports of Goods and Services   
        
 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Merchandise 81.5 -5.4 -4.3 78.0 1     2     79.5 4     5     83.5 
Tourism 4.3 -16.4 -18.1 3.5 - ½ -1     3.5 5¾ 8     3.7 
Other Services 64.9 2.6 1.4 65.8 3¾ 2     67.1 5     5½ 70.8 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 150.7 -2.3 -2.3 147.3 2¼ 2     150.1 4½ 5¼ 158.1 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1.2   1.2   1.2   1.3 
           
Adjusted Exports 151.9 -2.3 -2.3 148.5 2¼ 2     151.3 4½ 5¼ 159.3 
           
 26 
Figure 13: Quarter-on-Quarter % Change in Merchandise Exports, 
Constant Prices, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts , CSO and the European Central Bank.
 
 
The recent data from the Balance of Payments illustrate the mixed 
performance of services exports in 2009. The disruption in international 
financial markets is likely to have contributed to the decline of 11 per cent 
in value terms recorded in exports of financial services. Exports of 
insurance services declined by 17 per cent while tourism exports fell by 18 
per cent. Offsetting these declines were substantial year-on-year increases 
in receipts from royalties/licences, business services and other services. 
Exports of I.T. services also performed strongly and in Q4 2009 were over 
6 per cent higher compared to Q4 2008. Overall, services exports increased 
modestly by 0.2 per cent in 2009 compared to a year earlier.  
 
Based on the prospects for the world economy discussed in the 
International section, the outlook for Irish exports in 2010 and 2011 is now 
more favourable. The latest data from the Centraal Planbureau (CPB) 
points to an ongoing recovery in world trade in the early months of 2010. 
The most recent forecasts indicate that world trade volumes should 
increase by 7.5 per cent in 2010. We expect the recovery in the 
international economy and in world trade to boost the demand for Irish 
exports over the forecast horizon. Overall, we expect export growth to 
resume in 2010 following two years of contraction in export volumes. 
Having remained relatively intact despite the collapse in world trade, we 
expect merchandise exports to expand in volume terms by 1 per cent in 
2010 and 4 per cent in 2011. The manufacturing wholesale price index 
which is a good indicator of merchandise export prices has been increasing 
in recent months. As a result, we expect slightly higher growth in the value 
of merchandise exports in 2010 and 2011 of 2 and 5 per cent respectively.  
 
Turning to our forecasts for services exports, following a solid 
performance in 2009 we anticipate that non-tourism services exports will 
grow by 3¾ per cent in volume terms in 2010 and 5 per cent in 2011. We 
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expect a more sluggish recovery in tourism exports with a further small 
volume decline expected this year. For 2011, the volume of tourism exports 
is expected to grow by 5¾ per cent.  
 
 The most recent data for 2009 from the Quarterly National Accounts 
estimate that the volume of imports declined by over 9 per cent as shown 
in Figure 14. While there was a small increase in the volume of services 
imports of 0.4 per cent, merchandise imports fell by almost 22 per cent. 
2009 also saw a substantial decline in tourism imports of over 10 per cent.  
 
Consistent with the severe reduction in expenditure on consumption 
and investment, merchandise imports declined across a range of categories 
in 2009. According to the latest External Trade statistics, some of the largest 
year-on-year falls were recorded in imports of road vehicles and other 
transport equipment (-70 per cent), manufactured goods (-38 per cent) and 
petroleum and related products (-33 per cent, mostly due to falls in fuel 
prices), with declines also recorded in imports of consumption goods. With 
final demand expected to remain weak this year, we are forecasting a 
further decline in merchandise imports in 2010 of 6½ per cent in volume 
and 7 per cent in value. For 2011, we expect a modest rise in merchandise 
import volumes of 2 per cent.  
 
Current price data from the balance of payments suggest that services 
imports declined marginally in Q4 2009 following quarter-on-quarter 
increases in each of the previous three quarters. Growth in imports of 
royalties and business services was offset by reduced imports of insurance 
and financial services. Tourism imports declined during each quarter of 
2009 and were almost 10 per cent lower for the year as a whole compared 
to 2008. Looking ahead, we expect a small volume increase in other 
services imports of 2½ per cent in 2010, rising to 4¾ per cent in 2011. 
Tourism imports are expected to fall again this year by 2½ per cent with a 
return to growth of 2 per cent anticipated in 2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imports 
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Figure 14: Exports and Imports, Volume Growth Rates, Annualised 
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Based on a forecast recovery in economic activity, consumption and 
disposable income in 2011, we anticipate that total imports of goods and 
services will increase by 3½ per cent in volume in 2011, following a further 
contraction of over 1 per cent in total imports in 2010.  
 
 The sharp drop of over a fifth in merchandise imports in 2009 greatly 
exceeded the fall in merchandise exports which gave rise to a significant 
increase in the merchandise trade surplus of around €8.8 billion last year. 
The services trade balance deteriorated significantly in 2008 as a result of a 
decline in services exports. Services exports performed surprisingly well in 
2009 recording a small increase on their 2008 level. The performance of 
services exports, in addition to lower imports, contributed to a narrowing 
of the services trade deficit in 2009 by over €400 million. Our forecasts 
imply a further increase in the merchandise trade surplus both this year and 
next year. Our projections for services exports and imports indicate a 
further narrowing of the services deficit in both 2010 and 2011. Having 
increased by €9.2 billion in 2009, these projections would result in a further 
expansion in the overall trade balance from 25¼ per cent of GNP in 2010 
to 26¾ per cent in 2011; the equivalent figure for 2008 was just 11.9 per 
cent of GNP.  
 
Turning to net factor flows, the Q4 2009 balance of payments data 
show a sharp fall in 2009 in both factor inflows and factor outflows. Factor 
inflows decreased by 36 per cent driven mainly by a 43 per cent fall in 
portfolio investment income. Factor outflows also registered a substantial 
decline of 23 per cent. Our forecasts imply a further small reduction in 
factor outflows in 2010 followed by an increase in outflows in 2011 as the 
expected recovery in economic activity increases profit outflows from the 
multinational sector. Factor inflows are expected to remain unchanged over 
the period of the forecast. 
 
Balance of 
Payments 
  
Table 8: Imports of Goods and Services    
        
 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Merchandise 57.7 -21.6 -21.4 45.3 -6½ -7     42.1 2     4     43.8 
Tourism 7.1 -10.4 -10.9 6.3 -2½ -3     6.1 2     4     6.3 
Other Services 67.5 1.4 0.7 68.0 2½ 2     69.4 4¾ 5     72.8 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 132.2 -9.3 -9.6 119.6 -1¼ -1¾ 117.6 3½ 4½ 123.0 
           
FISIM Adjustment 0.8   0.7   0.7   0.7 
           
Adjusted Imports 133.0 -9.3 -9.6 120.3 -1¼ -1¾ 118.3 3½ 4½ 123.7 
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Table 9: Balance of Payments*  
        
 2008 Change 2009 Change 2010 Change 2011 
 €bn % €bn % €bn % €bn 
        
Merchandise Trade  Balance 23.8  32.6  37.4  39.7 
Service Trade Balance -5.4  -5.0  -4.8  -4.6 
 
Trade Balance in Goods and 
Services on BoP basis 18.4  27.7  32.5  35.1 
% of GNP 11.9  21.2  25 ¼  26 ¾ 
 Total Debit Flows 110.6 -22.9 85.3      -¾ 84.6 1½ 85.8 
 Total Credit Flows 83.8 -36.0 53.7 0     53.7 0     53.7 
Net Factor Flows  -26.8 18.0 -31.6 -2¼ -30.9 4     -32.1 
Net Current Transfers  -1.1  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9 
 
Balance on Current Account -9.4  -4.8  0.7  2.0 
        
Capital Transfers 0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Effective Current Balance  -9.4  -4.8  0.8  2.1 
% of GNP -6.1  -3.7            ¾  1½  
        
*This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis. 
 
Despite the increase in net factor income outflows, the expansion in the 
merchandise trade surplus contributed to a rapid fall in the current account 
deficit over the course of 2009. The latest Balance of Payments statistics show 
that the current account deficit fell to just €166 million in Q4 2009. As a 
result the current account deficit for the year as a whole fell to €4.6 billion 
or 3.7 per cent of GNP, the lowest annual deficit since 2004. Our 
projections for a further increase in the trade surplus both this year and 
next imply a rapid closure of the remaining deficit on the current account. 
As shown in Figure 15, we expect a small surplus on the current account of 
½ per cent this year and for this to increase to 1½ per cent in 2010.  
 
The increasing deficit on the current account of the balance of payments 
after 2003 was an important indicator of growing imbalances in the 
economy at that time. Similarly, the disappearance of that deficit over the 
course of 2009, and the prospects for the emergence of a current account 
surplus this year, is symptomatic of the important structural realignment 
currently underway in the Irish economy as it readjusts towards the 
exporting sector.   
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Figure 15: Current Account Balance, % of GNP 
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Table 10: Performance Indicators 
        
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(f) 2011(f) 
GNP in current prices 8.7 11.2 5.7 -4.1 -15.4 -1¾ 2¼ 
GNP, in constant 
prices 5.6 6.3 4.4 -2.8 -11.3 0 2¾ 
GNDI, constant 
prices 4.4 4.7 1.6 -4.1 -10.9 ¼ 2½  
National Resources 4.4 4.7 1.5 -4.1 -10.9 ¼ 2½ 
GNP per capita 
(constant prices) 3.3 3.7 2.0 -4.6 -12.1 ¼ 2½ 
Consumption per 
capita (constant 
prices) 4.3 3.9 3.5 -2.8 -8.0 -½  1½  
Investment in 
Housing/GNP 14.9 14.8 13.4 9.8 5.9 3½  3½  
Investment/GNP 31.5 31.2 30.7 25.5 19.5 15½  15½  
Domestic Demand 8.7 6.3 3.7 -4.4 -13.6 -3½  1 
Labour share of GNP 47.7 47.2 48.0 51.1 54.6 52 50½  
        
Source: CSO and own forecasts. 
 
Table 10 shows some indicators of the performance of the economy across 
the recent and forecast period. Because of the dramatic fall in incomes in 
2008 and especially 2009, it will take several years before the economy 
returns to pre-recession income levels. The recession which began in 2008 
led to a fall in volume income (GNDI) of 4 per cent in that year, this was 
followed by a dramatic decline of 11 per cent in 2009. For 2010 and 2011, 
our forecast figures suggest stagnation of volume income in 2010 followed 
by an increase of 2½ per cent in 2011. These figures imply that the 
cumulative fall in volume GNDI between 2007 and 2011 is of the order of 
12 per cent.  
 
Measures of 
Performance 
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In relation to money income, using GNP in current prices as a measure 
of the size of the economy, our forecasts suggest that by the end of 2011 
the economy will be one-fifth smaller than at its peak in 2007. This loss of 
income is illustrated in Figure 16, which shows the forecast figures for 
nominal GNP per capita. By the end of 2011, our forecasts suggest that 
income per head will be below 2003 levels. 
Figure 16: Nominal GNP Per Capita 
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The very rapid contraction in the economy is most sharply reflected in 
the investment figures. Investment as a share of GNP is forecast to halve 
from a peak of over 31 per cent in 2006 to just over 15 per cent by 2011. 
This adjustment was driven by the collapse in house building and other 
building and construction. Over the medium term, a share of 15 per cent is 
very low. The average in developed economies is typically around 20 per 
cent. 
 
 The Quarterly National Accounts for 2009 Q4 show that industrial output 
(including building and construction) fell by almost 9 per cent in 2009. 
Output in building and construction contracted during each quarter of 
2009 with the result that total building output in 2009 was 31 per cent 
lower than in 2008. For industry, excluding building and construction, 
output remained broadly unchanged over the course of 2009, declining by 
just 0.6 per cent.  
 
Figure 17 shows the weighted contributions to the total growth rate in 
output for building and construction, industry and services. The expansion 
in industrial output in Q1 2009 helped to offset the falls in output 
experienced in the other sectors over the course of the year. Following 
large falls in building and construction and services output during Q4 2008 
and in early 2009, there are some indications that the declines in output, 
particularly in services, are beginning to moderate. Services output recorded 
its smallest drop in 5 quarters during the final quarter of 2009. This reflects 
the solid performance of services exports discussed earlier. 
  
Sectoral 
Output 
  
Table 11: GDP by Sector    
        
 2008 % Change 2009 % Change 2010 % Change    2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Agriculture 3.7 5.4 -19.7 2.9 1     5     3.1 1     5     3.2 
                     
Industry: 52.2 -8.7 -11.4 46.2 -3 ¾ -4 ½ 44.1 3 ½ 3     45.4 
Other Industry 38.4 -0.6 -1.0 38.0 2     1     38.4 4 ½ 4     39.9 
Building & Construction 13.8 -31.2 -40.4 8.2 -26 ½ -30 ¼ 5.7 -1 ½ -4 ½ 5.5 
                     
Services: 106.3 -4.2 -8.5 97.3 1 ¼ - ¾ 96.7 2 ½ 2     98.6 
  
Public Administration & 
 Defence 6.2 -3.3 -2.4 6.0 -3     -11     5.4 -7     -8 ½ 4.9 
  
Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 25.3 -8.8 -8.8 23.1 1     1     23.4 2     2 ¾ 24.0 
  
Other Services 
 (including rent) 74.8 -2.8 -8.9 68.2 1 ¾ - ¼ 68.0 3 ¼ 2 ½ 69.7 
                     
GDP at Factor Cost  162.2 -5.4 -9.7 146.5 - ¼ -1 ¾ 143.9 2 ¾ 2 ¼ 147.3 
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Figure 17: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates, Weighted Contributions, 
Seasonally Adjusted9 
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The performance of the industrial sector over the course of 2009 is 
illustrated in Figure 18 which shows the annualised changes in the 
industrial production index. The graph emphasises the contrasting fortunes 
of the traditional and modern sectors in 2009. As discussed in the Exports 
section, the traditional sector has been more severely affected during the 
recession than other sectors as a result of its greater dependence on the UK 
market. The effects of the weakness of sterling and the downturn in the 
UK economy have had a major impact on the level of output produced in 
the sector as shown in Figure 18. While the pace of output decline in the 
traditional sector accelerated over each quarter in 2009, the opposite trend 
is evident for the modern sector. Annualised growth increased during each 
quarter last year and stood at 6 per cent in the final quarter of 2009. The 
strong performance of the modern sector, driven by the solid performance 
of pharmaceuticals exports, is helping to stabilise overall industrial output, 
despite the sharp fall in activity in the traditional sector.  
 
9 Weighted by the share in total constant price GDP at factor cost.  
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Figure 18: Annual Growth Rates in Industrial Production Index  
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Our forecasts suggest that total output in industry, excluding building 
and construction, will expand by 2 per cent in 2010 driven by a recovery in 
world demand. We anticipate that as the recovery gathers momentum in 
2011, industrial output excluding building will grow by 4½ per cent in 
volume terms. The ongoing difficulties in the building and construction 
sector are reflected in our forecasts for output. We expect another sharp 
fall in building and construction output of over 25 per cent in 2010 with a 
further 4½ per cent decline projected for 2011. If these forecasts 
materialise, by the end of 2011, total output of the building and 
construction sector will have fallen by a massive 66 per cent from its 2007 
level. The fall in output reflects the fall in the share of housing investment 
in GNP, which is expected to drop to just 3½ per cent in 2010 having 
peaked at almost 15 per cent at the height of the housing bubble.  
 
We expect that services output will increase by over 1 per cent in 2010 
and by 2½ per cent in 2011. The continued contraction in publicly 
provided services is expected to be offset by an increase in other services 
output as a result of the anticipated pick up in consumption.  
 
As discussed in Box 1 below on agriculture, 2009 was an extremely 
difficult year for the sector. Based on an expected recovery in dairy and 
beef prices, our forecasts suggest a modest increase in agricultural output 
of 1 per cent in both 2010 and 2011.  
 
Box 1: Irish Agriculture 
 
While the severe contraction in economic activity in Ireland in 2009 
affected all sectors of the Irish economy, the agriculture sector recorded 
particularly large declines in output and income over the course of the year. 
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Preliminary estimates from the CSO10 show that income in agriculture fell 
by almost a third in 2009. Based on records going back to 1973, this is the 
largest annual decline ever recorded in the operating surplus. The fall in 
income was driven by sharp falls in the value of agricultural output, 
especially milk and cereals, with poor weather and flooding also likely to 
have reduced output in 2009. Overall, output at farm gate prices declined 
by almost 19 per cent in value and 4 per cent in volume (Table 1A). While 
savings were made on inputs, with the value of intermediate consumption 
falling by 9.5 per cent, the deduction for depreciation remained broadly 
unchanged from 2008, which contributed to the dramatic decline in the 
overall operating surplus. 
 
     The structure of the agriculture sector is illustrated in Figure 1A which 
shows the share of gross output accounted for by the main commodities. 
In 2009, cattle and milk output accounted for over half of total gross 
output with cereals accounting for around 2 per cent of output. 
 
Figure 1A: Structure of Agriculture Sector: Main Commodities 
 
Cattle Milk Pigs Sheep Cereals Crops Other 
Source: CSO Output, Input and Income in Agriculture 2009- Preliminary Estimates.  
 
    The main commodity outputs from Irish farms experienced substantial 
price falls in 2009 as shown in Table 1A. The downturn in the international 
economy impacted on global food demand and contributed to the decrease 
in commodity prices observed over the course of 2009. The value of milk 
output declined by almost 33 per cent, or €530 million, due almost entirely 
to a decrease in milk prices. Cereals output declined by over 50 per cent in 
value and 30 per cent in volume. There was also an 11 per cent decline in 
the value of livestock output, again primarily driven by price falls. Despite a 
fall in intermediate consumption of almost 10 per cent, due to lower energy 
and fertilizer prices, gross value added at basic prices still fell by over 41 per 
cent in 2009.  
 
 
10 CSO, 2010. Output, Input and Income in Agriculture 2009- Preliminary Estimates.  
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    Net value added at basic prices measures the prices farmers receive for 
their output, net of product specific subsidies and taxes. In 2009, this 
declined by 77 per cent to just €195.5 million. In addition, farmers receive 
direct payments which in 2009 amounted to €1.9 billion. Thus, the 
operating surplus in agriculture fell from €2.3 billion in 2008 to €1.6 billion 
in 2009, a drop of almost 31 per cent.  
 
Table 1A: Output, Input and Income in Agriculture  
 
  2008 2009 Value Volume 
  € Million 
Change 
2008/2009 
All Livestock  2,541.0 2,250.4 -11.4 -3.2 
 Livestock - Cattle  1,668.0 1,485.3 -11.0 -1.4 
 Livestock - Pigs  333.8 299.9 -10.2 -2.2 
 Livestock - Sheep  171.4 161.2 -6.0 -9.9 
All Livestock Products  1,677.5 1,142.4 -31.9 -3.1 
 Livestock Products - Milk  1,629.7 1,100.8 -32.5 -3.2 
All Crops  1,608.2 1,340.4 -16.7 -6.7 
 All Cereals  200.0 94.5 -52.8 -34.2 
 Crops - Forage Plants  1,008.1 857.5 -14.9 -2.0 
Goods Output at Producer Prices  5,826.6 4,733.2 -18.8 -4.0 
 Contract Work  281.0 269.2 -4.2 -8.2 
 Subsidies less Taxes on Products  6.2 15.0   
Agricultural Output at Basic Prices  6,113.8 5,017.5 -17.9 -4.0 
Intermediate Consumption  4,493.9 4,065.8 -9.5 -3.6 
Gross Value Added at Basic Prices  1,619.9 951.6 -41.3  
 Fixed Capital Consumption  763.0 756.1 -0.9  
Net Value Added at Basic Prices  857.0 195.6 -77.2  
 Other Subsidies Less Taxes on 
Production  1,904.4 1,846.3 -3.1  
Factor Income  2,761.4 2,041.9 -26.1  
 Compensation of Employees  436.3 427.2 -2.1  
Operating Surplus  2,325.1 1,614.7 -30.6  
 
    To derive a measure of farm income at basic prices, it is necessary to 
deduct from net value added at basic prices expenditure by farmers on 
hired labour, interest payments on borrowed capital and land rental. In 
2009, these totalled €427.2 million, €328.0 million and €153.0 million 
respectively. This implies that in 2009, farm income at basic prices was 
minus €713 million. Thus, the only return to farm enterprises in 2009 came 
from direct payments paid for by the EU under the CAP and by the 
Exchequer.11 This highlights the dependence of farm enterprises on direct 
payments, a situation which leaves the agriculture sector highly vulnerable 
to future reforms of the CAP and to changes in the EU budget. 
 
    Despite the poor outturn for the agriculture sector in 2009, prices of the 
main agricultural commodities are expected to strengthen over the 
medium-term according to the latest projections from the OECD and 
 
11 In addition, payment of capital grants under the Farm Waste Management Scheme is 
expected to exceed €900 million. Payments to farmers under this scheme are being made 
on a phased basis over the period to 2011.  
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FAPRI.12 While food prices fell sharply in 2009 from the record levels 
reached in 2007, growth in population and incomes is expected to sustain a 
recovery in meat and dairy prices. Milk prices in Ireland are expected to 
recover gradually in 2010 while cattle prices are forecast to rise by 4 per 
cent.13 Thus some of the reduction in agricultural incomes which occurred 
last year should be reversed over the course of 2010 and 2011, as reflected 
in our forecasts. Nevertheless, the Irish agriculture sector faces a significant 
competitiveness challenge if it is to adjust to the more liberalised conditions 
which are likely to exist in international commodity markets in the coming 
years.  
 
 The latest figures from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) 
indicate that employment fell by 8.1 per cent in 2009, while the seasonally 
adjusted rate of unemployment in the final quarter of the year was 13.1 per 
cent. Figure 19 shows the quarter-on-quarter developments in employment 
and unemployment and reveals signs of relative stabilisation in the trend 
during the second half of 2009. The pace of increase (decrease) in the 
unemployment (employment) level has eased since 2009 Q2, and the latest 
Live Register figures suggest that this stabilisation pattern has continued 
into 2010. The seasonally adjusted monthly pace of increase in the Live 
Register averaged 0.2 per cent in the six months up to March 2010. In 
addition, the seasonally adjusted standardised rate of unemployment in 
March 2010 was 13.4 per cent according to the Live Register, compared to 
the QNHS estimate of 13.1 per cent in the final quarter of 2009. 
Figure 19: Unemployment Rate and Quarter-on-Quarter % Change in 
Employment, Seasonally Adjusted 
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12 OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2009-2018. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_36774715_36775671_42852746_1_1_1_1
,00.html; FAPRI 2009 World Agricultural Outlook: 
http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/outlook/2009/ 
13 http://www.teagasc.ie/publications/2010/20100118/ 
Employment 
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Table 12: Employment and Unemployment  
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
     
 2008   2009   2010     2011 
  
Agriculture 115 96 88 88 
Industry 520 411 373 373 
Services 1,465 1,422 1,395 1,397 
Total at Work 2,100 1,929 1,856 1,857 
Unemployed 141 258 294 280 
  
Labour Force 2,241 2,187 2,150 2,138 
Unemployment Rate % 6.3 11.8 13 ¾ 13 
Net Migration 38.5 -7.8 -60.0 -40.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 83.8 57.3 10.0 20.0 
Change in Participation Rate* -0.3 -1.2 - ¼ ¼ 
     
Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years; based on Q2 
figures as are migration figures. 
 
The slower pace of increase in the unemployment level may be partly 
due to the fall in labour force participation. Since the end of 2007 the 
labour force participation rate has fallen by 2.6 percentage points. This has 
formed a significant offset to the fall in employment in the measured 
unemployment rate. For example, between 2007 Q4 and 2009 Q4, total 
employment fell by 251,000 while total numbers unemployed increased by 
166,000. Had the numbers unemployed increased by 251,000, the measured 
unemployment rate in 2009 Q4 would be 15.7 per cent. The fall in 
participation has been much more pronounced among younger members 
of the working age population, particularly males. This is discussed in 
greater detail in Box 2.  
 
Such a sharp fall in labour force participation suggests that there may be 
a growing number of individuals who are not classified as unemployed, but 
are currently without work and are available for work. Using QNHS data, 
we can examine potential labour supply by extending our analysis beyond 
the standard measure of unemployment and including other jobless 
individuals who consider themselves available for work. Table 13 shows the 
standard unemployment rate at 2009 Q4 (unadjusted) as well as three wider 
measures of unemployment which are reported by the CSO. Individuals 
who are outside of the labour force but are available for work include 
passive jobseekers, discouraged workers and others not engaged in 
education. Within the labour force, part-time underemployed workers14 are 
another group who consider themselves available for additional work. If we 
include all of these groups, along with the individuals characterised as 
unemployed, then our measure of unemployment or potential labour 
supply rises to 16.5 per cent. The equivalent measure in the final quarter of 
2008 was 10.8 per cent, as shown in Figure 20. 
 
14 A respondent who works in a part-time job is classified as ‘underemployed’ if he/she is 
looking and available for another job and has explicitly stated that the hours worked 
currently are ‘too few’. 
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Table 13: Measure of Unemployment or Potential Labour Supply (%), 2009 
Q4 
     % 
 
1. Unemployed, as a percentage of the labour force 
 
12.4 
2. Unemployed plus ‘marginally attached’,15 as a percentage of 
the labour force plus ‘marginally attached’ 
13.3 
3. Unemployed plus ‘marginally attached’ plus others not in 
education who want work, as a percentage of the labour 
force plus ‘marginally attached’ plus others not in 
education who want work 
 
15.8 
4. Unemployed plus ‘marginally attached’ plus others not in 
education who want work plus underemployed part-time 
workers, as a percentage of the labour force plus 
‘marginally attached’ plus others not in education who 
want work 
 
16.5 
 
Figure 20: Potential Labour Supply,16 2007-2009 
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Source:  Quarterly National Household Survey, CSO.
 
The QNHS reveals other interesting dimensions in relation to the trends 
in unemployment. First, the Q4 figures indicate a widening spread between 
male and female unemployment, as shown in Figure 21. Male and female 
unemployment rates were essentially equal before the downturn in the 
economy, but the latest figures suggest that while the female 
unemployment rate is 9.0 per cent, unemployment among males is 
 
15 The category ‘marginally attached to the labour force’ includes passive jobseekers and 
discouraged workers. These are individuals who are available for work but are not actively 
seeking work, so are not included in the labour force and therefore are not characterised as 
unemployed. 
16 1,2,3 and 4 refer to the four measures of unemployment shown in Table 13. 
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considerably higher at 16.6 per cent. This development is not entirely 
surprising, given that over half of the total fall in employment over the last 
two years is accounted for by the construction sector.  
 
A second interesting development in the fourth quarter QNHS data 
relates to the trend in long-term unemployment.17 More than half of the 
increase in total unemployment in 2009 was in long-term unemployment, 
bringing the total level of long-term unemployment to 89,100. In 2009 Q4 
long-term unemployment accounted for 33 per cent of total 
unemployment, compared to 22 per cent a year previously. 
Figure 21: Male and Female Unemployment Rate 
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Turning to our forecasts, our views regarding 2010 are largely 
unchanged – we expect employment to average 1.86 million, implying a fall 
of 3¾ per cent relative to 2009. We are forecasting no significant change to 
the overall employment level in 2011. While the pace of increase in 
unemployment is likely to moderate further, we do expect to see some 
additional job losses in the financial sector, construction and the public 
sector. The unemployment rate is expected to peak at just under 14 per 
cent at the end of 2010, before falling back to an average rate of 13 per 
cent in 2011. 
 
Following a fall of 2.4 per cent in the size of the labour force in 2009, 
we expect to see a further fall of 1¾ per cent this year and ½ per cent next 
year. This will result in the labour force averaging 2.14 million in 2011, a 
level last seen in 2006. The decline in the labour force will be driven by a 
further fall in the participation rate in 2010 and by an expected net outflow 
of 60,000 in the year ending April 2010, followed by an additional net 
outflow of 40,000 in the year ending April 2011. 
 
17 According to the QNHS, long-term unemployment refers to individuals who have been 
unemployed for one year or more. 
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Box 2: Unemployment and Labour Force Participation 
 
The true impact of the current recession is probably best reflected in the 
challenging labour market conditions. The total number of people in 
employment has fallen by 12 per cent since the end of 2007, and the 
current rate of unemployment stands at 13.1 per cent of the labour force. 
The pace of increase in the numbers unemployed slowed in the second half 
of 2009, partly due to the sharp fall in labour force participation. The 
participation rate has now fallen by almost three percentage points since 
the end of 2007. A period of rising unemployment is often associated with 
a decline in participation, as many individuals become discouraged about 
their work prospects, while others choose to return to education.  
 
    The fall in labour force participation over the last year has not been 
uniform across the working age population, as shown in Table 2A. The 
overall participation rate fell by 1.7 percentage points between Q4 2008 and 
Q4 2009, with a higher fall of 2.7 percentage points for males. The data in 
Table 2A show that the fall in participation has been concentrated among 
the youngest and oldest groups in the working age population, and in 
particular among individuals aged 15-19 years and among males aged 20-24 
years. In total, there were 69,100 fewer people in the labour force in Q4 
2009 compared to the same period in the previous year. The fall in 
participation by those in the 15-24 year age cohort accounts for over half 
of that overall decline. 
 
Table 2A: Year-on-Year Change in Participation Rate by Selected Age 
Category, 2009 Q4 
 
      All     Male Female 
Working age population -1.7 -2.7 -0.7 
15 - 19 years -3.3 -1.7 -5.1 
20 - 24 years -2.8 -5.6 0.1 
55 - 59 years -2.0 -4.4 0.5 
60 - 64 years -1.8 -3.9 0.3 
 
    Table 2B examines in detail the change in the status of those aged 15-19 
years and 20-24 years, between the third quarter of 2008 and the third 
quarter of 2009.18 The data indicate that there was a decline of over 60,000 
in the total number of males and females aged 15-25 in the labour force 
between Q3 2008 and Q3 2009. While some of this decline is explained by 
demographic effects,19 approximately 26,000 individuals in this cohort are 
now classified as not in the labour force. Of this 26,000 who are not in the 
labour force, over two thirds are classified as students. 
 
 
 
 
 
18 For the purpose of this detailed analysis we used data on student numbers, provided by 
the CSO. At the time of writing these data were only available up to 2009 Q3. 
19 Between Q3 2008 and Q3 2009 there was a fall of approximately 35,000 in the total 
population aged 15-24 years.  
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Table 2B: Year-on-Year Change in Status of Working Age Population, Age 
15-19 Years and 20-24 Years, Q3 2009 
 
    
Q32008 (000) 
 
Q32009 (000) 
 
Year-on-Year 
Change (000) 
 
   
15-19 
Years 
 
20-24 
Years 
 
15-19 
Years 
 
20-24 
Years 
 
15-19 
Years 
 
20-24 
Years 
 
Males Total  144.2 164.2 141.7 147.1 -2.6 -17.1 
 In Labour Force 43.9 136.5 33.6 111.3 -10.3 -25.2 
  
Not in Labour 
Force  100.3 27.7 108.1 35.8 7.8 8.1 
  
Of which 
Students  97.0 19.8 103.4 23.5 6.4 3.8 
  Others  3.3 8.0 4.7 12.3 1.4 4.3 
Females Total  139.6 167.0 136.6 154.5 -3.0 -12.4 
  In Labour Force 43.5 119.8 29.7 108.5 -13.8 -11.4 
  
Not in Labour 
Force  96.1 47.1 106.9 46.1 10.8 -1.1 
  
Of which 
Students  91.4 27.6 102.9 24.5 11.5 -3.2 
  Others  4.7 19.5 4.1 21.6 -0.7 2.1 
Total Total  283.9 331.2 278.3 301.6 -5.5 -29.5 
  In Labour Force 87.4 256.3 63.3 219.8 -24.1 -36.5 
  
Not in Labour 
Force  196.4 74.9 215.0 81.9 18.6 7.0 
 
Of which 
Students  188.4 47.4 206.3 48.0 17.8 0.6 
  
Non-Students 
Not in Labour 
Force  8.0 27.5 8.7 33.9 0.8 6.4 
 
    Looking at these younger age categories in more detail, the fall in 
participation by those aged 15-19 years is particularly striking and would 
appear to suggest that the youngest members of the working age 
population are choosing to remain in education. This is confirmed by the 
data in Table 2B and by Figure 2A. While the total number of individuals 
aged 15-19 years classified as not in the labour force increased by 18,600, 
this was almost entirely driven by an increase in the number of students in 
this age cohort. Young males in the 20-24 years category have also 
experienced a sharp fall in participation in the last year. This partly reflects 
the fact that they have been most exposed to job losses in the construction 
sector. The total fall in employment between Q3 2008 and Q3 2009 among 
this cohort was approximately 37,500. However, while 12,400 males in this 
age category became characterised as unemployed during this period, an 
additional 8,100 males aged 20-24 years became classified as not in the 
labour force, compared to the same period in 2008, as shown in Table 2B. 
Looking at statistics on male students aged 20-24 years, there has been an 
increase of approximately 3,800 students classified as not in the labour 
force over the same time period. This suggests that less than half of the 
8,100 males aged 20-24 years who left the labour force between Q3 2008 
and Q3 2009 are now engaged in education.  
 
    Figure 2A shows the number of students by single year of age from 15-
24 years as a proportion of the total population by single year of age. The 
  44 
graph indicates an increase in the proportion of students across all age 
groups, with the exception of those aged 24 years. The increase in the 
proportion of students by age has been particularly pronounced for certain 
groups. For example, the number of students as a percentage of the total 
population aged 21 years has increased from 27 per cent in Q3 2007 to 36 
per cent in Q3 2009. The graph indicates a significant increase in the 
number of students within the cohort aged 15-24 years who have exited the 
labour force and are now in the education system. The increase in the 
number of students is also reflected in the rise in the number of 
applications received by the Central Applications Office (CAO) in 2010. 
The number of applications for third level places increased to 72,000 this 
year, a 10 per cent increase compared to the previous year. 
 
Figure 2A: Students by Single Year of Age as a Proportion of Total 
Population by Single Year of Age 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Single Year of Age
%
2007Q3 2008Q3 2009Q3  
 
    The contraction in economic activity in Ireland which has taken place 
since 2008 has been reflected in a significant deterioration in labour market 
conditions with a sharp rise in unemployment and a decline in labour force 
participation. The decline in the overall participation rate has been driven 
by a fall in participation among the youngest and oldest age groups in the 
working age population. In particular, there has been a sharp fall in 
participation among all persons aged 15-24 years. The analysis here 
indicates that a significant proportion of those who have exited the labour 
force, but who remain in Ireland, are now engaged in education, 
particularly those aged under 20 years. Approximately 86 per cent of all 
individuals aged 15-24 years who are not in the labour force are classified 
as students. Previous ESRI research on the labour market (O’Connell, 
2009)20 shows the importance of raising the skill level of those who have 
 
20 O’Connell, P.J., 2009. “What Works? Applying Lessons from the 1990s”, Available at 
http://www.esri.ie/docs/What_works_300049.ppt#256,1. 
 45 
lost their jobs or exited the labour force in order to minimise the risk of 
long-term unemployment.  
 
 The most recent data on wages come from a new CSO survey which 
covers all sectors of the economy. The data series begin in 2008 Q1 and the 
most recent release at the time of writing provides preliminary estimates for 
2009 Q2. Table 14 summarises the annual rate of change in weekly and 
hourly earnings from these series. The picture presented is quite mixed. In 
relation to average weekly earnings, these fell across several sectors in the 
first two quarters of 2009, most notably in financial insurance and real 
estate sectors at -13.3 per cent in 2009 Q2, 21 but also in a range of other 
sectors including construction, wholesale and retail trade, transportation 
and storage. The fall across all sectors was -1.1 per cent. However from the 
data it appears that most of this fall in weekly earnings was due to a fall in 
hours worked, the data on hourly earnings estimate that hourly wage rates 
rose by 3.6 per cent in 2009 Q1 and 1.8 per cent in 2009 Q2. With so little 
data it is difficult to detect a pattern. Nevertheless, across all sectors the 
data that are available suggest a downward trend in wages in the first two 
quarters of 2009.  
Table 14: Annual Changes in Average Earnings for All Employees 
   
 Average 
Weekly 
Earnings 
Hourly 
Earnings 
 2009 
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
2009 
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
All sectors 0.3 -1.1 3.6 1.8 
     Private sector -1.7 -3.1 2.0 0.2 
     Public sector 3.1 1.3 4.6 2.6 
Industry  1.2 0.6 5.8 4.4 
Construction 2.9 -1.3 7.3 4.0 
Wholesale and retail trade -1.7 -1.7 1.5 1.3 
Transportation and storage -3.2 -3.5 1.6 -2.3 
Accommodation and food services -3.3 -1.5 2.5 0.6 
Information and communication -4.3 0.1 -3.3 1.1 
Financial, insurance and real estate -11.8 -13.3 -10.5 -11.6 
Professional, scientific and technical 4.1 -1.8 4.5 -1.6 
Administrative and support services  -1.8 -0.6 2.3 1.1 
Public administration and defence 2.3 0.7 0.3 0.4 
Education 5.8 1.0 6.6 4.1 
Human health and social work 3.1 0.3 5.9 3.3 
Arts, entertainment, recreation and other 
service  -2.7 -1.2 3.2 1.2 
     
 
 
 
 
 
21 The fall in hourly earnings in the financial, insurance and real estate sector was largely 
due to a significant fall in irregular bonuses, in 2009 Q2 hourly earnings fell by -11.6, 
excluding bonuses this was -0.6.  
Incomes 
  
Table 15: Personal Disposable Income    
        
 2008 Change  2009 Change       2010 Change 2011 
           
 €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn 
           
Agriculture, etc. 2.9 -25.0 -0.7 2.2 5     0.1 2.3 5     0.1 2.4 
Non-Agricultural Wages 78.9 -9.5 -7.5 71.4 -6 ½ -4.6 66.9 -1     -0.6 66.2 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 19.2 -17.0 -3.3 15.9 -3 ¾ -0.6 15.3 22 ½ 3.5 18.8 
           
Total Income Received 101.0 -11.4 -11.5 89.5 -5 ¾ -5.1 84.5 3 ½ 3.0 87.4 
Current Transfers 24.3 9.4 2.3 26.6 8     2.1 28.7 1 ¾ 0.5 29.3 
           
Gross Personal Income 125.3 -7.3 -9.2 116.1 -2 ½ -2.9 113.2 3     3.5 116.7 
Direct Personal Taxes 23.4 -6.1 -1.4 22.0 -2 ½ -0.6 21.4 5 ½ 1.2 22.6 
           
Personal Disposable Income  101.9 -7.6 -7.8 94.1 -2 ½ -2.3 91.8 2 ½ 2.3 94.1 
Consumption 93.9 -10.3 -9.7 84.2 -2     -1.7 82.5 2 ½ 2.1 84.5 
Personal Savings 8.0   10.0   9.3   9.6 
Savings Ratio 7.9   10.6   10 ¼   10 ¼ 
Average Personal Tax Rate 18.7   18.9   19       19 ¼ 
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The new series also provides an estimate of private sector and public 
sector wages. These suggest that there were significant falls in private sector 
weekly earnings in the first two quarters of 2009; while these falls were 
mainly due to falls in hours worked the growth in hourly earnings in 2009 
Q2 was just 0.2 per cent suggesting stagnation in wage rates. The figures 
for the public sector suggest that public sector hourly wages grew by 2.6 
per cent in 2009 Q2. However, it is important to emphasise that these 
estimates of public sector earnings do not take account of the 7 per cent 
pension levy introduced in 2009 Q2. Figure 22 shows the pattern of hourly 
earnings for all employees. These data suggest that hourly earnings have 
started to fall. Assuming that this downward trend in wage rates continued 
for the rest of 2009 we estimate that average earnings could have fallen by 
2 per cent in 2009.  
Figure 22: Hourly Earnings 
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Source: Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS), CSO.  
 
For 2010 our forecast is for a larger fall in average earnings of 3 per 
cent. This is partly driven by the cuts in public sector pay rates in the 
budget, but also by an expectation that the weak labour market will 
continue to put downward pressure on private sector wage rates. For 2011 
our tentative forecast is for a further fall in average wage rates of 1 per 
cent. These cuts if realised will impact on the real standard of living of 
those in employment. The sustained fall in consumer prices throughout 
2009 will have helped to cushion the real impact of these nominal wage 
falls. However, given that we expect consumer prices to stabilise in 2010 
and even increase slightly in 2011, this means that in 2010 and 2011 real 
wages will also fall significantly if our forecasts prove accurate.  
 
Combining these wage forecasts with our employment numbers means 
that we estimate non-agricultural wage income to have fallen by -9.5 per 
cent in 2009. Despite an increase in transfer income of 9.4 per cent, total 
disposable income is estimated to have fallen by 7.6 per cent. While 
dramatic, this is exceeded by the estimated fall in consumption of 10.3 per 
cent, consequently, we estimate that the savings rate in 2009 has risen to 
10.6 per cent. As discussed in the previous Commentary there is strong 
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evidence of precautionary savings behaviour among households as they 
attempt to restore their balance sheets.  
 
Our forecasts for 2010 and 2011 do not imply any significant change in 
the savings rate in these years. Further falls in wages and employment will 
lead to a further fall in wage income of 6½ per cent in 2010. This dramatic 
fall is likely to be offset by a forecast 8 per cent increase in transfer income 
so that total disposable income is forecast to fall by 2½ per cent in 2010, 
implying a savings rate of 10¼ per cent. For 2011 we expect a modest pick-
up in both consumption and disposable income, with the savings rate 
unchanged at 10¼ per cent. The average personal tax rate in 2011 is 
expected to increase to 19¼ per cent due to budgetary measures already 
introduced and an anticipated further increase in direct personal taxes in 
the 2011 budget.  
 
 The annual average rate of inflation, measured by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), was -4.5 per cent in 2009. This followed annual inflation of 
4.1 per cent in 2008. Having reached a trough at -6.6 per cent in October 
2009, the pace of price decline has moderated in recent months, and 
according to the latest figures from the CSO, the CPI fell by 3.2 per cent in 
February 2010, compared to the same period last year. The pace of decline 
in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) has also slowed. This 
index fell by 2.4 per cent in February, year-on-year. 
 
While the pace of overall price decline in 2009 averaged 4.5 per cent, 
many of the sub-indices of the CPI fell by significantly more. Figure 23 
shows the annual percentage change in the overall CPI and a variety of its 
components, both in 2008 and 2009. The mortgage interest component, 
the single biggest contributor to CPI volatility over the last two years, fell 
by 40 per cent in 2009, following the aggressive cuts to ECB interest rates. 
Excluding this component from the CPI reduces the average rate of 
inflation in 2009 to -1.2 per cent. Energy prices have been another source 
of overall CPI volatility during 2008 and 2009 as shown in Figure 23, falling 
by an average of 8 per cent last year. Although the price of electricity and 
gas rose marginally, petrol, diesel and home-heating oil prices fell sharply in 
2009, by 8 per cent, 18 per cent and 32 per cent respectively. We expect to 
see some reversal in these trends this year, as oil prices are projected to be 
30 per cent higher on average in 2010.22 However, gas and electricity prices 
are expected to moderate over the coming year. Prices of food, clothing 
and footwear also showed significant declines last year and this is largely 
related to the weakened sterling and its impact on the prices of goods that 
are heavily imported from the UK. 
 
 
 
22 NIESR Economic Review, No. 211, January 2010. 
Consumer 
Prices 
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Figure 23: Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index and Selected Sub-
Indices, 2008 and 2009 
 
-40.0 
-30.0 
-20.0 
-10.0 
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
CPI overall Mortgage
Interest
Repayments
Energy
Products
Clothing and 
Footwear
Food and Non-
Alcoholic
Beverages
%
2008 2009 
Source: Consumer Price Index, CSO.
  
Looking ahead, we expect the CPI to increase marginally this year, by ¼ 
per cent. We are forecasting average CPI inflation of 1¾ per cent in 2011. 
Once again, we expect the mortgage interest component to be the main 
driver of price growth and so, as ever, our forecasts are sensitive to our 
assumptions regarding future interest rates. As discussed in the International 
section, we are not currently expecting to see any ECB interest rate 
increases in 2010, given the current forecasts for Euro Area growth and 
inflation. However, we have factored in two further 50 basis point 
increases in domestic mortgage interest rates in the coming months, in light 
of recent announcements by a number of Irish mortgage lenders. As 
pointed out in the International section, our inflation forecasts imply an 
overall reduction in the real interest rate, in spite of the assumed increases 
in the nominal interest rate. The importance of the mortgage interest 
component as the main source of overall price increases is evident in our 
forecasts for the HICP, which does not include mortgage interest 
repayments. We expect HICP inflation to average -1½ per cent this year 
and ½ per cent next year. These forecasts take into account the current 
expectations regarding exchange rates, as outlined in the International section 
above. However, if sterling were to weaken further, this would put 
additional downward pressure on HICP inflation. 
Table 16: Inflation Measures (%) 
      
 2007 2008 2009 2010(f) 2011(f) 
CPI 4.9 4.1 -4.5 ¼ 1¾  
Mortgage Interest 40.4 15.0 -40.0 22 29 
HICP (Ireland) 2.9 3.1 -1.7 -1½  ½ 
HICP (Euro Area) 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.3 1.1 
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PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT 
The decline in the annual rate of change in headline private sector credit 
(PSC) continued during the last months of 2009 and into 2010. Headline 
PSC declined in June 2009 for the first time since 1993 and the pace of 
decline has accelerated in recent months (Table 17). Following seven 
consecutive monthly falls, headline PSC declined by 6 per cent in the year 
ending December 2009. Around two-thirds of this annual decline was due 
to valuation effects, including write-downs of loans, increased bad debt 
provisions and exchange rate effects as the euro strengthened during the 
year reducing the book value of non-euro denominated loans.  
 
There have recently been important changes in the factors accounting 
for the fall in credit outstanding to the private sector. Up to November 
2009, the majority of the decline in PSC was due to valuation effects with 
the underlying stock of private sector credit remaining broadly unchanged. 
Recent months have seen a reversal of this trend with the fall in private 
sector credit in December 2009 and in the early months of 2010 being 
driven by changes in underlying transactions rather than valuation effects. 
Following a decline of almost €1.2 billion in December, PSC declined by 
€2.4 billion in January and by a further €3.9 billion in February. These 
declines were primarily due to underlying transactions as repayment of debt 
exceeded draw-downs during these months.  
Table 17: Private Sector Credit 
       
 
End 
Month 
 
Private 
Sector 
Credit 
 
Un-
adjusted 
Growth 
Year-on-
Year 
 
Adjusted 
Year-on-
Year 
 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Lending 
 
Adjusted 
Year-on-
Year 
 
  € million % % € million % 
2007 December  376,796 18.6 17.0 139,842 13.4 
2008 March  384,340 17.1 17.1 142,403 11.6 
 June  392,937 14.6 14.1 145,341 10.2 
 September  399,143 10.8 10.5 147,550 8.5 
 December  395,070 4.9 7.3 148,115 5.9 
2009 March  392,258 2.1 2.4 148,542 4.3 
 June  387,350 -1.3 -0.8 148,349 2.1 
 September  378,086 -5.3 -3.4 147,969 0.3 
 December  371,879 -5.9 -6.0 147,654 -0.3 
2010 January 369,461 -7.2 -7.1 147,385 -0.7 
 February 365,527 -8.2 -7.3 147,229 -0.9 
       
Source: Central Bank Monthly Statistics.   
 
Residential mortgage lending accounts for around 40 per cent of total 
private sector credit outstanding. Growth in residential mortgages 
outstanding moderated sharply during the first half of 2009, and in 
November 2009, fell by €134 million following a decline of €161 million in 
October. The November 2009 decline represented the eight consecutive 
monthly fall in mortgage lending outstanding and resulted in a fall in 
mortgage debt outstanding on a year-on-year basis of €207 million or 0.1 
per cent. This was the first annual decline in mortgage lending outstanding 
since the series began in the early 1990s. Mortgage debt outstanding 
Monetary 
Sector 
Developments 
 51 
declined further in December 2009 and during the early months of 2010 
with the annual rate of change in mortgage lending falling to -0.9 per cent 
by the end of February.  
 
Deleveraging by the household and company sector, as shown in the 
latest statistics in Table 17 on private sector debt outstanding, is reflected 
by developments in the flow of funds in the Irish economy (Figure 24). 
Our forecasts imply that as a result of the decline in the financing needs of 
the household sector as well as the increase in the savings rate, the rate of 
net acquisitions of the household sector should remain in surplus in 2010 
and 2011. A continuation of the current trend of debt repayment exceeding 
new credit outstanding would also reduce the overall liabilities of the 
banking system.  
Figure 24: Flow of Funds in the Irish Economy 
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CREDIT CONDITIONS 
The fall in private sector credit discussed above reflects the ongoing weak 
demand for credit and the contraction in credit supply as a result of banks’ 
balance sheet constraints and the higher cost of sourcing funds. The ECB’s 
Bank Lending Survey provides evidence on credit conditions in the Irish 
economy. According to the latest Bank Lending Survey, which is based on 
the responses of senior lending officers in the participating banks, credit 
standards on loans to enterprises tightened further during Q4 2009 as 
shown in Table 18.  
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Table 18: ECB Bank Lending Survey, Change in Credit Standards 
      
  
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
2009 
Q3 
2009 
Q4 
2009 
Enterprises Overall 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.40 
 Loans to SMEs 2.20 2.75 3.00 2.75 
 
Loans to large 
enterprises 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.25 
 Short-term loans 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.40 
 Long-term loans 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.40 
Households House purchase 2.75 2.50 2.75 3.00 
 
Consumer credit and 
other lending 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 
 
1 = tightened considerably; 2 = tightened somewhat; 3 = basically unchanged;  
4 = eased somewhat; 5 = eased considerably 
 
Source: ECB Bank Lending Survey. 
 
Credit standards on loans to both SMEs and large enterprises tightened 
during the final quarter of 2009. The tightening of credit standards was due 
mainly to an increase in banks’ cost of funds and balance sheet constraints. 
For households, credit standards on loans for house purchase and for 
consumer credit remained unchanged in Q4 2009. The demand for loans 
from both households and enterprises remained weak in the final quarter 
of 2009. Lower levels of fixed investment and uncertainty regarding 
housing market prospects contributed to the decline in demand.  
 
The Bank Lending Survey included for the first time questions regarding 
the expected change in credit standards on loans to enterprises and 
households over the coming year. The participating banks indicated that 
they expect credit standards to remain unchanged over the next 12 months.  
BANK FUNDING 
Dislocation in Euro Area money markets since September 2008 resulted in 
an increase in Irish credit institutions’ borrowing from the Central Bank. 
This lending to credit institutions by the Irish Central Bank has in turn 
been funded by the ECB through refinancing operations such as its longer 
term refinancing operations (LTROs). As shown in Figure 25, lending to 
credit institutions by the Irish Central Bank as part of the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy operations peaked in June 2009 at over €130 billion as 
banks availed of a new 12 month LTRO.  
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Figure 25: Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System and Credit 
Institutions Borrowing from the Central Bank, % of GDP 
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A gradual normalisation of interbank markets over the second half of 
2009 resulted in a reduction in Irish banks’ borrowing from the Central 
Bank and a gradual increase in net external liabilities as access to wholesale 
funding improved. The provision, in December 2009, of the Eurosystem’s 
final 12 month LTRO resulted in a reversal of this trend with Irish credit 
institutions’ borrowing from the Central Bank rising by almost €13 billion 
to over €90 billion or around 56 per cent of GDP (Table 19). The 
provision of non-standard measures by the ECB is being phased out as part 
of the exit strategy from exceptional policy interventions. As a result, it is 
expected that Irish banks’ dependence on borrowing from the Central 
Bank will decline in the coming months. Meanwhile, the repayment of debt 
by the private sector, discussed in the section above, should reduce the 
overall liabilities of the banking system, both domestic and foreign.   
 
In discussing the liabilities of the banking system, it is important to 
distinguish between the liabilities of Irish owned banks and the liabilities of 
all credit institutions located in Ireland. In February 2010, the liabilities of 
all financial institutions resident in Ireland amounted to €1,296 billion. 
However, the liabilities of Irish owned banks were €567 billion, less than 
half of the total, and not all of these are covered by the government 
guarantee. The remaining liabilities (€729 billion) are not contingent 
liabilities of the Irish government. The large difference between the figure 
for the total liabilities and the liabilities of Irish banks is due to the presence 
of foreign credit institutions in Ireland, mostly IFSC companies.  
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Table 19: Central Bank Lending to Credit Institutions in Ireland 
      
  
Lending by 
the Irish 
Central Bank 
to Credit 
Institutions 
in Ireland 
 in € 
Eurosystem 
Net Lending 
to Euro Area 
Credit 
Institutions 
in €, Related 
to MPO 
Credit 
Institutions 
in Ireland, 
Share of 
Eurosystem 
Lending 
Credit 
Institutions' 
Borrowing 
from the 
Central 
Bank, % of 
GDP 
      
2007 March 24,020 421,633 5.7 12.7 
 June 25,535 438,038 5.8 13.5 
 September 23,751 420,169 5.7 12.5 
 December 39,449 475,324 8.3 21.0 
2008 March 34,395 483,600 7.1 19.0 
 June 38,373 460,645 8.3 21.2 
 September 58,671 471,362 12.4 39.2 
 December 88,562 613,857 14.4 54.0 
2009 March 120,628 607,356 19.9 79.8 
 June 130,423 615,980 21.2 83.9 
 September 91,573 583,939 15.7 53.9 
 December 90,899 564,495 16.1 55.6 
      
 
Box 3: Measures Adopted by the Government in Support of the Banking 
System 
 
On 30 March 2010 the government announced the latest in a series of 
measures aimed at resolving the financial crisis and addressing the needs of 
individual banks. The latest announcement follows a number of important 
measures implemented by the government since September 2008 in 
response to the financial crisis. These measures began with the introduction 
of the deposit guarantee scheme and the two year blanket guarantee of all 
deposits, covered bonds, senior debt and dated subordinated debt for six 
Irish institutions. In early 2009, the government announced a programme 
of recapitalisation and nationalisation. Anglo Irish Bank was nationalised 
and €4 billion in State funding was provided for recapitalisation. In 
February 2009, the government announced that it would provide €3.5 
billion in core tier 1 capital for both Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland 
(Table 3A). This recapitalisation programme would be funded from the 
National Pensions Reserve Fund.  
 
    In the April Supplementary 2009 Budget, the government announced its 
plans for the establishment of the National Asset Management Agency 
which would buy loans of around €80 billion from the covered banks at an 
appropriate discount and pay for them by the issue of Irish government 
bonds. The legislation giving effect to the set up of NAMA was passed in 
early November 2009. In January this year, the NPRF acquired 180 million 
ordinary shares in Bank of Ireland, equivalent to the amount of the 
dividend owed to the State in respect of the preference shares it received 
under the recapitalisation agreement. This transaction left the State with a 
16 per cent shareholding in the Bank of Ireland. 
 
    The process of transferring the first tranche of loans from the designated 
financial institutions to NAMA began in March 2010. These loans 
represent 20 per cent of the anticipated total assets to be transferred to 
NAMA. It was announced that NAMA would pay €8.5 billion for the first 
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tranche of loans which have an estimated book value of €16 billion. New 
capital requirements have been imposed by the Regulator on the banks 
which stipulate that they must meet an 8 per cent core tier 1 capital 
requirement by the end of 2010.  
 
    Based on an assessment of capital requirements for each bank, the 
Regulator announced the additional capital requirements for each of the 
institutions participating in NAMA. Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland 
are estimated to need additional capital of €7.4 billion and €2.4 billion 
respectively. If additional State funding is needed to enable these 
institutions to meet the capital requirement, it will be provided by the 
NPRF.  
 
Table 3A: Overview of Existing and Estimated Government Support to        
Banks 
 
 
Total of Existing and 
Estimated State 
Investment in the Banks 
Source of Exchequer 
Funding 
 € billion  
 
Anglo Irish Bank* 
 
22.3 
 
€4 billion already provided 
by Exchequer. €8.3 billion to 
be paid over 10-15 years via 
issue of promissory note. 
Irish Nationwide 2.6 Exchequer via Issue of 
Special Investment Shares 
and promissory note. 
Allied Irish Bank 3.5 NPRF 
Bank of Ireland 3.5 NPRF  
EBS  0.8 Exchequer via Issue of 
Special Investment Shares 
and promissory note. 
   
Total of existing and 
estimated State 
recapitalisation 
32.7  
Payment Planned for 
Loans under NAMA 
              40 - 50 Issue of government 
guaranteed NAMA bonds. 
*€12.3 billion in State funding has already been committed with a further €10 billion      
  likely to be required. 
 
    Regarding Anglo Irish Bank, the government announced that it would 
be providing €8.3 billion immediately to boost the bank’s capital position. 
These funds will be provided in the form of a promissory note payable 
over 10-15 years. In addition, the government announced that the bank 
may need a further €10 billion to cover future losses. This would bring the 
total amount of funding provided by the State for the recapitalisation of 
Anglo Irish Bank to 22.3 billion, as shown in Table 3A.  
 
    The Regulator determined that EBS and Irish Nationwide will need €0.8 
billion and €2.6 billion to meet capital requirements. Since the NPRF 
cannot invest in non-listed institutions, this capital will be provided directly 
by the State.  
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    Honohan (2002)23 distinguishes three different channels through which a 
banking crisis impacts on the macroeconomy. The first of these is the stock 
component – the waste of resources, which would include the houses built 
that are unlikely ever to be occupied, the costs incurred by those who fail 
to meet their mortgages, and the wipe out of important financial 
institutions. The second channel is the fiscal cost of the crisis – something 
that one can only begin to estimate as the elements of the resolution of the 
banking crisis become clearer. The third, which Honohan refers to as the 
flow component, is the slump in the economy that has occurred as a result 
of the banking crisis.  
 
    The potential fiscal costs (the second channel) of the current crisis can 
usefully be separated into three elements:  
 
• NAMA;  
• the recapitalisation of Bank of Ireland, AIB and the EBS and; 
• the recapitalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and the Irish Nationwide 
 Building Society. 
     
In the case of NAMA there is a prospect that the eventual returns on the 
assets may equal the cumulative price paid for them, leaving no net cost for 
the Exchequer. However, the gross sums (assets and liabilities) are large 
and even small unexpected losses or gains could see a substantial 
cumulative benefit or cost for the State. 
 
    The second element of the bank rescue, the recapitalisation of the banks 
“with prospects”, also holds out the possibility that the State may recoup 
its eventual investment in their recapitalisation. Should the economy 
recover as suggested in Bergin et al. (2009), the banking system could also 
return to profitability. Such a return to profitability due to an economic 
recovery would allow the State to sell its stake in these banks with a good 
prospect of realising its investment (including the associated costs of 
financing that investment). However, as with NAMA, the gross assets 
(shares in the banks) and the related liabilities of the State are likely to be 
large and minor difference in rates of return on these assets could see the 
State realising either a significant gain or a significant loss in the long term. 
 
The third element of the banking resolution is the treatment of Anglo Irish 
Bank and Irish Nationwide. We now know that the State may end up 
“investing” up to €25 billion in these two institutions – approximately 15 
per cent of GDP. As of today, there seems little prospect of the State 
recouping a significant part of this investment. As a result, it is this element 
of the banking resolution that is likely to account for the vast bulk of the 
fiscal cost for the State. 
 
The third channel (identified by Honohan, 2002) through which the 
banking crisis will impact on the economy is the cumulative loss of output 
 
23 Honohan, P., 2002. ‘Comment on “Costs of Banking System Instability: Some empirical 
evidence”’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 857-860.  
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as a result of a recession induced by the banking crisis. In the case of the 
current economic crisis not all the loss of output can be attributed to the 
banking crisis in Ireland. In fact a serious recession was already inevitable 
as a result of the bursting of the property market bubble and the wider 
world recession. Nonetheless, the banking crisis has greatly aggravated the 
situation, and if not addressed, it has the potential to greatly prolong the 
pain associated with the crisis.  
 
    While the costs involved in restoring the domestic banking system to 
health are substantial, the Exchequer outlay should be affordable. In 
addition, it is important to place the long term cost to the State from the 
resolution of the banking system in the context of the debts accruing as a 
result of borrowing to fund the normal day-to-day activities of the 
government. Ireland’s national debt increased by almost €38 billion 
between 2007 and 2009 due to extremely large increases in the General 
Government Deficit incurred during that period. The General Government 
Deficit this year is expected to amount to around €19 billion. While the 
measures taken to address the banking crisis will aggravate the debt burden 
faced by the State and increase uncertainty, the overall cost to the State as a 
result of these measures may turn out to be smaller than the deficit 
accruing as a result of the normal activities of government. This highlights 
the importance of ensuring there is no slippage in terms of the announced 
budgetary targets for the coming years. 
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GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
In their paper of May 2009 Bergin et al.,24 showed that, with a reasonable 
recovery in the world economy and assuming that outcomes in respect of 
the public finances, competitiveness and the banking system are all 
achieved, the Irish economy could rebound from its current difficulties to 
see an average rate of growth in GDP in the region of 5 per cent per 
annum between 2011 and 2015. This could restore income to pre-recession 
levels by 2015. It remains our view that such rates of growth are achievable 
in the coming years. In generating our forecasts for 2011 we had to decide 
first if it was the case that the relevant conditions were likely to be in place 
to facilitate growth of this magnitude in 2011. On balance, we formed the 
view that a more modest pace of growth in 2011 was more likely and our 
analysis has led to us forecasting a growth rate of 2½ per cent in GDP in 
2011.  
 
Before setting out where we see obstacles to achieving the higher 
growth rates in the medium term, we can point to the factors which we 
believe are turning in Ireland’s favour and which were central to the 
analysis in Bergin et al. (2009).   
 
The world’s economies continue to show signs of recovery. While the 
pace of recovery is uneven across countries, no major economy remains in 
recession. This was not the case at the time of the last Commentary, as the 
UK only emerged from recession in Q4 2009. As fiscal and monetary 
policy remains highly stimulatory across the globe, fears remain about the 
potential deflationary impacts of exit strategies, especially if they are poorly 
timed relative to sustainable recoveries taking hold. However, on balance 
we can be increasingly confident about the prospects for the world 
economy. 
 
Since the on-set of recession in Ireland, we have argued that a strong 
export performance would be needed to lead Ireland out of recession. The 
improved global environment is necessary to facilitate it but a second 
condition is also required, namely, improved competitiveness. As discussed 
in the section on Incomes above, the data which we have available to us on 
earnings relate to Q2 2009. Based on those data, there was no conclusive 
evidence of falls in hourly earnings in the private sector. However, our 
expectation is now that wages across the economy will have fallen by 2 per 
cent in 2009 and that they will fall by 3 per cent in 2010 and by a further 1 
per cent in 2011. With GDP-based productivity expected to grow by 3¾   
 
24 Bergin et al., 2009. Recovery Scenarios for Ireland, ESRI Research Series No. 7, Dublin: 
Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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per cent in 2010 and by 2¾ per cent in 2011, the combined effect will be 
positive for competitiveness. As an illustration, our forecasts suggest that 
labour’s share of GNP will fall from 54.6 per cent in 2009 to 50½ per cent 
in 2011. This demonstrates that we are optimistic with respect to the 
competitiveness challenge which built up in the years leading up to the 
economic collapse.  
 
In the context of wages falls, the Box above on agricultural incomes  
shows how the income falls being experienced in that sector are particularly 
severe. Along with those who have lost their jobs, it appears that farmers 
have suffered losses in this recession which generally exceed those suffered 
by people who remain in employment. 
 
Restoration of sustainability in the public finances was another element 
which underpinned the thinking in Bergin et al. (2009). As discussed in the 
last Commentary, in the immediate aftermath of Budget 2010, the overall 
management of the public finances can be viewed in positive terms. One 
important development since the Budget has been the successful 
conclusion of talks between the government and the leadership of the 
public sector unions, although at the time of writing it was unclear as to 
whether the agreement would be approved by the union membership. 
While the pay cuts announced in Budget 2010 were in line with the 
thinking set out in a number of Commentaries, the prospect of widespread 
industrial action in the public sector, were it to occur, has the potential to 
erode some of the reputational credit which the government had earned in 
international lending markets. To the extent that this could lead to a 
renewed widening in interest rate spreads, the successful conclusion of the 
process initiated by the Labour Relations Commission could yield real 
economic benefit in addition to avoiding lost output through work to rules 
and strikes. A further benefit would accrue in the form of greater efficiency 
in the delivery of public services as a result of the proposed changes in 
work practices. A more efficient delivery of public services would provide 
another boost to the economy’s competitiveness, as lower taxes would be 
needed to fund a given level of service. Just as the traded sector of the 
economy has to adjust continually to the challenges imposed by global 
economic changes, we see the proposed changes in the public sector as this 
sector reacting to challenges imposed upon it as a result of the collapse in 
tax revenue in particular. 
 
The world economy, expected improvements in competitiveness and 
the strategic management of the public finances are now providing positive 
inputs into the overall economic context which Ireland will face in the 
medium term.25 However, challenges remain in the short term and it is 
these which have led us to temper our expectations for growth in 2011 
relative to the possibilities which hold in the medium term.  
 
 
25 Of course, in the short term efforts to reduce the public deficit are acting as a negative 
in terms of growth in a direct sense, even if such efforts are important for re-building 
confidence in the medium-term and in holding down interest rate spreads. 
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The restoration to health of the banking system has been seen by us and 
many others as being a necessary condition for the achievement of growth 
rates in the region of 5 per cent. In spite of the announcements on this 
issue on March 30, it remains unclear as to whether the Irish banking 
system will be in a position to support strong growth through appropriate 
lending in the near future.  
 
A number of positives can be taken from the March 30, 2010 
announcements. For example, the discount on the first tranche of loans 
going into NAMA, at 47 per cent, exceeded expectations and so lessened 
concerns about taxpayers over-paying for distressed assets. However, the 
revelations in respect of the scale of losses in Anglo Irish Bank and the 
consequent needs for recapitalisation were well beyond anything that we, 
like many others, had anticipated. 
 
Bergin et al. (2009) based their analysis on a recapitalisation need of €20 
billion and also assumed that NAMA would be paying €50 billion for the 
assets it purchased. As discussed above, the final recapitalisation need is 
likely to be at least €33 billion assuming €25 billion goes to Anglo Irish and 
Irish Nationwide combined. Clearly, there will be extra demands on the 
public finances arising from the interest that will be paid. As the financing 
will be provided in part through promissory notes, the precise timing of the 
interest implications is unclear to us but they will be significant. 
 
To put the €25 billion which has gone or will go to Anglo Irish Bank 
and Irish Nationwide in context, it is equal to about 15 per cent of 
(forecast) 2010 GDP. While such an addition to the national debt is 
obviously large, it is manageable. When combined with the resolute action 
on budgetary matters, we can feel increasingly assured that the overall 
solvency of the State is not under threat. But having said that, it also has to 
be said that the taxpayer should never have been put in a position whereby 
it had to fund Anglo Irish Bank to this extent. If the bank was of systemic 
importance, and that has never been established to our satisfaction, it 
should have been regulated accordingly. Hopefully, the banking enquiry 
will shed more light on this so that lessons can be learned. 
 
Apart from banking, another critical plank of strong recovery is 
domestic confidence, on the part of both consumers and investors. With 
ongoing wage falls envisaged for next year, continued migratory outflows 
and the probability of tax increases in Budget 2011, it is difficult to 
envisage any significant spending surge on the part of consumers. We do 
expect consumer spending to grow but we do not expect a significant 
turnaround in the savings rate. For investors, we do see a greater degree of 
optimism and expect, for example, that investment in machinery and 
equipment will grow by 10 per cent in 2011. 
 
Our experience in forecasting for much of 2009 was of continual 
downward revisions. Our forecasts for 2011 are our best estimate based on 
current information but we are mindful of the possibility that we might be 
surprised on the upside during the coming months. 
KEY OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN: 
NEW EVIDENCE FROM GROWING 
UP IN IRELAND 
James Williams*and Sheila Greene** 
*Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
**Trinity College, Dublin 
 
 
 The welfare of children is a key concern of Irish society and of 
government policy. A major new project, Growing Up in Ireland, aims to 
describe the lives of a large scale representative sample of Irish children, and 
to analyse the factors associated with positive and negative outcomes in 
terms of such areas as health and education. Such evidence is of critical 
importance in guiding policy choices affecting children. The study is a 
longitudinal one, i.e. it will follow two groups or “cohorts” of children over 
time: a cohort of 11,000 infants (nine months old) and cohort of 8,500 nine-
year olds. A recently published report† based on initial data gathered on the 
nine-year old group already provides a great deal of interesting evidence on 
several domains of child outcomes including:  
 
• physical health and well-being, 
• educational achievement and intellectual development, 
• social, emotional and behavioural well-being. 
 
In this bulletin article we summarise some of the key findings regarding 
the educational achievement and intellectual development of nine-year olds, 
and their physical health.  
 
The Growing Up in Ireland study gathered information on the reading and 
mathematical ability of the nine-year-olds, using the Drumcondra reading 
and maths tests. Academic success, even at nine years of age, was strongly 
related to the child’s socio-economic circumstances. Figure 1, for example, 
outlines the proportion of children with the lowest reading scores (among 
the bottom 20 per cent or bottom “quintile”) classified by level of maternal 
education. This shows that children whose mother was herself less well 
educated were much more likely to be in the lowest reading quintile than 
were the children of graduate mothers (30 per cent compared with 8 per 
cent).  The corollary, of course, is seen on the right hand side of Figure 1, 
which shows that 36 per cent of children whose mother is a graduate were 
in the highest reading quintile, compared with 11 per cent of those whose 
mother left school at lower secondary level or less.  The pattern for other 
aspects of social background (income, social class etc.) was consistent with 
that for maternal education.  
 
 
 
* james.williams@esri.ie; **sgreene@tcd.ie 
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Figure 1: Proportion of Nine-Year-Olds with Reading Scores Among the Lowest and 
Highest One-fifth, Classified by Level of Maternal Education 
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The pattern of children’s performance in Maths was very similar to that 
in reading. In general, children from higher social class backgrounds, 
income categories and maternal education groups had a much higher chance 
of being in the highest quintile of scores on the Maths test (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Nine-Year-Olds with Maths Scores Among the Lowest and Highest 
One-fifth Classified by Family Social Class 
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The importance of the intellectual and cognitive development of children 
cannot be over-emphasised. The child’s early experiences in the home, in 
school and in the broader community will have a significant impact on that 
development which will, in turn, have long-term consequences for his/her 
life chances. A child’s attitude towards and engagement with school have 
been identified as having an important effect on his/her academic 
performance. 
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Nine-year-olds generally had a very positive attitude towards school. 
Over one-quarter (27 per cent) said they Always liked it, 67 per cent said 
they Sometimes liked it and only 7 per cent said they Never liked.  Similar 
positive views were expressed about their teacher (only 6 per cent of nine-
year-olds said they Never liked their teacher). Overall, girls had a somewhat 
more positive attitude towards school than boys.  
 
Absenteeism among children will clearly affect their school performance. 
On average, nine-year-olds were absent from school on 6.4 days in the year 
preceding their interview.  Significant differences in the number of days 
missed were apparent in terms of the child’s socio-economic characteristics.  
For example, children whose mothers had lower levels of educational 
attainment had higher levels of absenteeism than those whose mothers were 
third level graduates (7.6 days compared to 5.4 days respectively). 
 
Childhood health is important for children’s well-being and development 
and is a good predictor of adult health. It is also widely accepted that the 
experience of poor childhood health may contribute to socio-economic and 
other differences in health later in life (e.g. Palloni, Milesi, White and 
Turner, 2009). 
 
The majority of nine-year-old children were reported by their mother to 
be in good health – 73 per cent were reported to be Very Healthy and 25 per 
cent to be Healthy with a few minor problems.  Although there were no 
statistically significant differences in the health statuses of boys and girls, 
children from higher social class groups were more likely to be reported as 
Very Healthy than those from lower ones – 76 per cent of nine-year-olds 
from Professional/Managerial groups were reported to be Very Healthy 
compared with 69 per cent of those from Semi-skilled/Unskilled Manual 
backgrounds (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Children Regarded by Main Caregiver as “Very Healthy” by 
Family Social Class 
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Overall prevalence of on-going chronic illness or disability among nine-
year-olds was reported at 11 per cent by their mothers, with 7 per cent of 
the children who had a chronic illness or disability being reported to be 
severely hampered by it in their daily activities.1 
 
Increases in childhood overweight and obesity have been recognised as a 
serious public health problem (National Taskforce on Obesity, 2005).  
Obese children have a higher chance than others of becoming obese adults 
(Dietz, 1998) and the link between childhood obesity and health problems 
in later life has been well established (Regan and Betts, 2006).   
 
Using international thresholds for Body Mass Index (BMI) Growing Up in 
Ireland found that 19 per cent of nine-year-olds were overweight and a 
further 7 per cent were obese.  This means that one in every four nine-year-
olds in Ireland has an elevated BMI.  Girls were significantly more likely 
than boys to be overweight (22 per cent compared with 16 per cent) and 
obese (8 per cent compared with 6 per cent).  Social gradients were also 
clearly apparent in the weight status of nine-year-olds.  A total of 22 per 
cent of children from the Semi-skilled/Unskilled Manual group were 
classified as overweight compared with 18 per cent of children from 
Professional/Managerial backgrounds. The corresponding figures for 
obesity were 11 per cent and 4 per cent respectively (Figure 2). 
 
 Figure 4: Proportion of Children Classified as “Overweight” or “Obese” by Social 
Class Category  
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The policy and related challenges presented by some of the findings 
contained in the first substantive report from Growing Up in Ireland are 
substantial.  In important areas such as health and education the clear social 
(and in some cases gender) differentiation in child outcomes, even at the 
relatively early age of nine years, must be a source of concern and a matter 
of focus for policymaking and service delivery. 
 
 
1 This means that 0.7 per cent of all nine-year-olds were reported by their mothers as 
experiencing a chronic illness or disability and being severely hampered by it. 
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The specific issues sketched above represent only a tiny fraction of the 
information recorded in the Growing Up in Ireland project. A wealth of 
quantitative and qualitative information has been recorded from an array of 
informants – from the children themselves, their parents/guardians, 
teachers, school principals, non-resident parents and other regular care-
givers, as appropriate to the age and circumstances of the child.  An 
anonymised version of the data will shortly be deposited in the Irish Social 
Science Data Archive (ISSDA). This will facilitate all interested researchers 
in their work on children and child development. The longitudinal approach 
greatly enhances the analytical potential of the project, particularly in 
identifying causal relationships and establishing links between early events 
and experiences on the one hand and later outcomes on the other.  
 
The study covers a broad range of child outcomes with a view to 
documenting how well children in Ireland are doing along a number of key 
dimensions. In so doing, it will facilitate comparison with findings from 
similar international studies, as well as establishing domestic norms. Being 
longitudinal in nature the study will also address developmental trajectories 
over time and will allow researchers to explore the factors which have the 
greatest impact on those trajectories and on the life chances of children as 
they grow and develop.  By providing an evidence-base of research and 
insights into children and childhood, the study will inform and contribute to 
the setting of responsive policies and the design of services for children and 
their families. 
 
†WILLIAMS, J., S. GREENE, E. DOYLE, E. HARRIS, R. LAYTE, S. 
MCCOY, C. MCCRORY, A. MURRAY, E. NIXON, T. O’DOWD, M. 
O’MOORE, A. QUAIL, E. SMYTH, L. SWORDS, M. THORNTON, 
2009. The Lives of 9-Year-Olds, Growing Up in Ireland/National Longitudinal Study 
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IS A CODE OF PRACTICE NEEDED 
FOR THE GROCERY TRADE? 
Paul K. Gorecki*  
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 The introduction of a Code governing grocery supplier/retailer relations, 
enforced by an Ombudsman, is favoured by the Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment in its Consultation Paper, Code of Practice for Grocery 
Goods Undertakings (August 2009). A recent analysis of the issues† questions the 
need for a Code, and suggests that the issues which have prompted calls for 
such a Code would be better dealt with in the context of the government’s 
“better regulation” agenda and the provisions of the Competition Act as 
amended in 2006. 
 
The Code proposed in the Consultation Paper constrains the behaviour of 
the retailer with respect to certain practices that include those that shift risk 
from the retailer to the supplier as well as those that result in unexpected costs 
to suppliers. For example, a retailer shall not directly or indirectly require a 
supplier to make any payment or grant any allowance for the advertising or 
display of grocery goods. The rationale for the Code appears to be that 
devaluation of sterling, combined with the recession means that retailers are 
able to put increased pressure on local suppliers for lower prices, which in turn 
squeezes suppliers’ margins. In other words, retailers can import grocery 
products either from the UK or elsewhere at lower prices than are available 
from suppliers and distributors in Ireland. This gives rise to an alleged 
imbalance in the relationship between retailers, on the one hand, and suppliers 
and distributors, on the other. 
 
Governments normally intervene in markets where there are market failures 
relating to market power, externalities and information problems. These 
market failure rationales do not apply in the case of the Code. In reality the 
Code is a form of protectionism occasioned by the inflow of lower priced 
imports. The retailer is simply the channel through which these lower-priced 
imports reach consumers. The problem facing Irish suppliers is not the retailer, 
but the competition from imports. Local suppliers should adapt through 
developing better products and becoming more efficient, rather than seeking 
shelter from market forces. At the same time, macroeconomic policies are 
currently aiming to restore Ireland’s competitive position. 
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One of the objectives of the Code is to restore “balance” between retailer 
and suppliers. Viewed in this context the key objective of the Code is to 
restore the old equilibrium. The Code permits the restoration of the status quo 
by reducing the freedom of manoeuvre and discretion of the retailer through 
the adoption of explicit and transparent contracts and restricting the availability 
of certain discounting mechanisms. This is meant to increase the bargaining 
power of the supplier vis-à-vis the retailer and thus increase the return to 
suppliers. If the above characterisation is accepted as reasonably accurate, then 
grocery prices are very likely to be higher under the Code than without the 
Code. 
 
It is argued that the Consultation Paper should be withdrawn and reissued, 
but in a manner consistent with the government’s better regulation agenda 
which is currently ignored. This agenda sets a framework within which 
regulation can be assessed prior to its introduction. The framework requires 
that the question of necessity be addressed.  In other words, is the regulation 
necessary? The Consultation Paper sidesteps that question, focusing almost 
entirely on the details of how the Code would be specified and operated, with 
little attention given to the issue of whether a Code should be introduced.  
 
Although the Consultation Paper discusses the need to enhance consumer 
welfare and ensure that there is no impediment to the passing-on of lower 
prices to consumers, there is no provision in the Code that ensures that these 
conditions are satisfied. This contrasts with the Competition (Amendment) Act 
2006, which includes a competition test and also applies to the grocery sector. 
If a compelling case can be made that there are business practices that damage 
competition and consumers in the grocery sector, then such practices should 
be either prosecuted under the 2006 Act, or the Act should be amended to 
outlaw them. 
  
The objectives of the Code are inherently contradictory. The Code’s stated 
purpose is to achieve balance between grocery undertakings, while at the same 
time increasing consumer welfare and ensuring that there is no impediment to 
lower prices being passed-on to the consumer. However, in achieving balance 
the Code proposes to constrain the behaviour of retailers in favour of suppliers 
so that the Code is likely to lead to a rise in prices for suppliers with no 
mechanisms or tests for considerations of consumer harm to be taken into 
account. Amending the 2006 Act where a compelling case can be made would 
be a better option. 
 
 
†GORECKI, P.K., 2009. “A Code of Practice for Grocery Goods 
Undertakings and an Ombudsman: How to Do a Lot of Harm by Trying to 
Do a Little Good”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 2009. 
  
 
 GET BACK IN THE GAME: SPORT, 
THE RECESSION AND KEEPING 
PEOPLE ACTIVE 
Pete Lunn* 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 International research has established that the importance of physical activity 
for health is more serious than its role in the “obesity epidemic”, which 
inspires so much commentary. Physical activity reduces the risk of various 
cancers, coronary heart disease, stroke and diabetes, and improves skeletal 
health. A major part of the overall physical activity of adults consists of sport 
and recreational physical exercise. To the extent that sports policy has the 
ability to increase participation in sport and exercise, there is consequently a 
sound justification for spending public money on it.  
  
The Irish Sports Monitor† is a large, representative survey of participation in 
sport and exercise by adults (16 years and over). In 2008, it revealed that 
weekly participation had dropped from 32.9 per cent in 2007 to 30.8 per cent, 
abruptly halting a rising trend over recent decades. Although the fall was 
somewhat compensated for by more people walking and cycling as a mode of 
transport, it nevertheless means that of those adults engaged in a regular 
physical activity in 2007, one-in-sixteen had ceased participation one year later. 
Those who dropped out are likely to suffer a direct impact on their health and 
quality of life.  
 
Evidence strongly suggests that this significant change in sport and exercise 
habits was linked to the recession. Although prior to the recession those in 
higher income groups were very much more likely to participate, the 
relationship strengthened markedly in 2008. Furthermore, while traditional 
team sports maintained their participation rates, popular but relatively 
expensive individual pursuits, such as personal exercise (going to the gym, 
exercise classes, etc.) and golf, were the activities most affected. One in every 
seven members of a gym or health/fitness club gave up their membership in 
2008. Young men, the social group whose economic prospects have been 
hardest hit, had the greatest fall in participation.  
 
How should policy respond? The Institute’s programme of research in 
sport and physical activity, undertaken in collaboration with the Irish Sports 
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 Council, provides a significant body of evidence that can inform policy 
choices.  
 
In line with international research, we find evidence that those who 
participate in sport and exercise in Ireland benefit through better health. Thus, 
to the extent that public funding contributes to higher participation, cuts in the 
sport budget are likely to result in significant costs to individuals and society, in 
terms of poorer public health.  
 
Yet while higher participation is the primary stated goal of sports policy, in 
recent years over 60 per cent of the sports budget assigned to the Department 
of Arts, Sport and Tourism has been directed to elite rather than grassroots 
sport. Tight public finances and the fall in participation demand that 
policymakers refocus on their main target. 
   
The survey evidence on barriers to participation is clear. While there 
remains scope for improving facilities for young children, lack of sporting 
facilities no longer presents a barrier to adult participation in Ireland. Thus, if 
cuts must be made, the evidence concurs with last year’s decision to suspend 
the Sports Capital Programme, which provides grants for clubs (not schools) 
to improve facilities.  
 
Instead, the most effective way to attract people is likely to involve tackling 
the main barriers to participation faced by adults, which are family and work 
commitments. International evidence shows that it is possible to increase 
participation through the organisation and marketing of affordable and 
convenient sporting opportunities, such that existing facilities are used more 
frequently.   
 
At whom should participation programmes be targeted? Much existing 
policy effort aims to get children involved in sport. While this is an important 
policy goal, the evidence shows that greater attention needs to be paid to 
adults, because a large proportion of people drop out as they enter adulthood. 
Continued participation generally involves making the transition, usually in 
young adulthood, from team sports to individual sports such as swimming, 
personal exercise, golf, running and many minority sports. The importance of 
this transition is particularly noticeable in the Midlands region, which has the 
highest participation in team sports in Ireland, yet the lowest proportion of 
adults participating in sport and exercise overall. Young adults in lower socio-
economic groups are most likely to drop out; more so during the recession.  
 
Hence, we need participation programmes to organise and market events 
and opportunities that target less advantaged adults and that appeal to those 
who are likely to have moved on from the sports of their youth. Activities need 
to be affordable and to cover a variety of sport and exercise pursuits. Local 
sports partnerships, local authorities and sporting national governing bodies 
constitute networks through which such policies can be implemented. 
 
The sport budget is not there merely to promote recreation and 
entertainment, though it may enhance both, but should instead be considered 
an important part of public health policy. The recession is reducing our 
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physical activity and hence harming our health. An effective policy response 
requires funding, but it also requires that the funding goes to where evidence 
indicates it will get the highest return. 
 
 
 
 
 
†LUNN, P., R. LAYTE, 2009. The Irish Sports Monitor, Second Annual Report 
2008, Dublin: The Irish Sports Council and the Economic and Social Research 
Institute. 
THE ESRI ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACCOUNTS 
*Seán Lyonsa and Richard S.J. Tola,b 
 
a Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
b Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
 
 The national accounting framework, including such key concepts as Gross 
National Product, is a vital input to economic decision making. However, 
the standard national accounting framework does not take account of the 
pressure or damage to the environment caused by the economic activity. 
Thus, similar levels of GNP might involve quite different environmental 
damage, with implications for both current and future welfare and economic 
activity. Environmental accounts are now constructed in many countries to 
take account of these concerns, building on initial research by Nordhaus et 
al. (1972) and agreed international standards (United Nations et al., 2003). 
Environmental accounts build on the well-established and coherent national 
accounting framework, but add to this what are termed “satellite accounts” 
dealing with environmental issues, in a way which allows for them to be 
integrated and measured in a more comprehensive framework. This 
provides an increasingly sound basis for decision making on the 
environment. 
 
A recent paper** presents the ESRI Environmental Accounts for the 
Republic of Ireland 1990-2006. The paper describes the principles of 
environmental accounts, and illustrates their use by discussing trends in 
emissions and resource use in Ireland, by comparing the trend in carbon 
dioxide emissions in Ireland to other countries, and by attributing emissions 
to consumption. 
 
There are four parts to the environmental accounts: (1) emissions and 
waste, (2) resource use, (3) expenditures on environmental protection, and 
(4) economic value. Data are given by economic sector. The ESRI 
Environmental Accounts are the most extensive accounts for Ireland, and 
the only ones that adhere to the international standards. There are 63 
substances (26 emissions, 12 types of waste and 25 resources) for 20 sectors 
(19 production sectors plus households) for the period 1990-2006. The data 
come primarily from the Central Statistics Office (CSO), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and Sustainable Energy Ireland (SEI). Data on 
expenditures on environmental protection will be available in the near 
future. Data on the economic value of the environment is scattered and 
inconsistent. While the amount of data on emissions and resource use is 
impressive at first sight, the ESRI Environmental Accounts are heavily 
skewed towards climate and energy, with a reasonable coverage of waste and 
acidification. The use of land, water, and materials is largely omitted. Large 
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groups of chemicals, including many potentially harmful ones, have to be 
ignored because of the lack of suitable data. 
 
The ESRI Environmental Accounts are proper satellite accounts of the 
National Accounts. We can, therefore, readily integrate economic and 
environmental data. This allows us to interpret trends and, for example, 
allocate responsibility for particular emissions to the relevant sectors of 
activity. 
 
Figure 1: A Decomposition of the Growth Rate of Emissionsa 
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a The average annual growth rate for the period 1990-2006 is presented as the white insert. 
The growth rate is decomposed into the economic growth rate, the rate of structural 
change in the economy, technological and behavioural change, and a residual.  The figure 
for dioxins is a projected value; the rest were measured. 
Source: ESRI/EPA ISus model. 
 
Figure 1 shows the average growth rates for the period 1990-2006 for 
emissions to air and energy use; this data is taken from the environmental 
accounts. Some emissions have fallen, notably sulphur dioxide, carbon 
monoxide, and volatile organic compounds. Other emissions have 
increased, notably carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion. Figure 1 also 
shows a decomposition of the growth rate (Ang, 2005); this data is taken 
from the integrated environmental and economic accounts. Economic 
growth has increased all emissions. Changes in the structural composition of 
the economy has increased some emissions (process carbon dioxide, sulphur 
hexafluoride) but decreased others (ammonia, methane, laughing gas). 
Technological and behavioural change has reduced all emissions, and 
particularly sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and volatile organic 
compounds. 
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Figure 2: The Carbon Intensity of Ireland, Other EU Countriesa and the 
USA 
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a EU countries are split into the 15 countries that were Member States between 1995-2004 
and the 12 countries that have joined since 2004. 
Source: ESRI Environmental Accounts; http://earthtrends.wri.org 
 
For carbon dioxide, economic growth outpaced technological change. 
Emissions thus increased. Technological and behavioural change reduced 
emissions at a rate of 4.5 per cent per year, however. Figure 2 shows that 
this is unusually fast in an international context. While in 1990 Ireland 
emitted 50 per cent more carbon dioxide per euro value added than the rest 
of Western Europe, this difference had disappeared by 2005 (despite a low 
use of public transport in Ireland). Ireland’s rate of improvement in carbon 
intensity was comparable to that of Eastern Europe. 
 
Figure 3: Fossil Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Ireland by Demand 
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Source: ESRI/EPA ISus model. 
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The ESRI Environmental Accounts are production accounts: Emissions 
are allocated to the economic activity that generates the emissions. But 
because the environmental accounts are integrated with the economic 
accounts, we can use an input-output table to construct consumption 
accounts†, in which emissions are attributed to final consumption. Figure 3 
shows whose consumption is ultimately responsible for carbon dioxide 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Households are the largest indirect 
emitters, followed by exports, the public sector, and capital accumulation. 
Figure 3 shows three distinct trends. Carbon dioxide emissions from 
domestic production for domestic consumption increased by about one-
fifth between 1990 and 2006. Carbon dioxide emissions from domestic 
production for export out of Ireland doubled between 1990 and 2000, and 
then levelled off. Carbon dioxide emissions from foreign production for 
import into Ireland tripled in size between 1990 and 2006. 
 
Fossil carbon dioxide emissions from domestic production for domestic 
consumption are further decomposed using household consumption data 
(CSO, 2008). This shows that the 10 per cent of people with the lowest 
incomes are responsible for only 5 per cent of emissions. The emissions 
share gradually increases for higher income deciles. The 10 per cent of 
people with the highest incomes are responsible for 15 per cent of 
emissions. While the average income of the richest 10 per cent is 14 times as 
high as the average income of the poorest 10 per cent; the average CO2 
emissions are only 3 times as high. 
 
Figure 4: Biodegradable Waste Generation Per Household Per Year By 
Electoral District (Imputed) 
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Source: ESRI Regional Environmental Accounts. 
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Emissions can also be analysed by location and activity using the 
Tourism Satellite Accounts (Fáilte Ireland, 2005). Three-quarters of fossil 
carbon dioxide emissions from domestic production for domestic 
consumption is by people at home. Nine per cent is by Irish residents on 
leisure or business trips in Ireland, and 2 per cent by Irish residents on their 
way abroad. Foreigners travelling to Ireland for leisure or business account 
for 14 per cent of emissions. 
 
The ESRI Environmental Accounts are nationwide. Some environmental 
issues are local rather than national in nature, while environmental policy 
may have varying effects on different areas. Selected parts of the 
environmental accounts have therefore been downscaled, imputing 
emissions, energy use and waste on the basis of census data§. Figure 4 
shows a map of biodegradable waste from households, averaged for each of 
the 3,401 electoral districts. The pattern is largely determined by the average 
household size with income playing a smaller role. There are distinct 
differences between the cities (small families), the commuter belt (large 
families), and the deep countryside (small families). 
 
Environmental accounts are a powerful tool to understand pressures on 
the environment, particularly when integrated with economic accounts. The 
ESRI Environmental Accounts are the most extensive accounts for Ireland. 
In this paper, we illustrate their use by decomposing trends in emissions, by 
comparing Irish trends to international trends, by attributing emissions to 
consumption, by splitting emissions by type of consumption and by 
imputing waste per local area. 
 
Future research will extend the ESRI Environmental Accounts and 
develop further tools for interpretation, for example, distinguishing between 
imports for export and imports for consumption. Extensions will include 
material flows, expenditures on environmental protection, and the value of 
the environment. 
 
 
 
 
**LYONS, S., K. MAYOR and R.S.J. TOL, 2009. “Environmental 
Accounts for the Republic of Ireland: 1990-2005”, Journal of the Statistical 
and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. 37, pp. 190-216. 
†O’DOHERTY, J. and R.S.J. TOL, 2007. “An Environmental Input-
Output Model for Ireland”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 38,  
No. 2, pp. 157-190. 
§TOL, R.S.J., N. COMMINS, N. CRILLY, S. LYONS and E.L.W. 
MORGENROTH, 2009. “Towards Regional Environmental 
Accounts”, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 308, 
pp. 105-142. 
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 IDENTIFYING THE BARRIERS TO 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
PARTICIPATION 
*Selina McCoy and Delma Byrne 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 As economic circumstances remain difficult and CAO applications reach 
record numbers, there has been renewed focus on higher education. In part 
this reflects the severe deterioration in labour market opportunities for young 
people, particularly in relation to apprenticeships.  Postponement of labour 
market entry among school leavers more generally and growing numbers of 
(young) adults returning to college to improve their skills also play a role. In 
this context, identifying the potential barriers young people face in gaining 
entry to college is of central importance. Furthermore, identifying barriers to 
higher education participation is of great policy relevance given the impact of 
third level education on life chances. A recent study† focuses on a group 
which has not shared in the general trend towards increased third-level  
participation – the “lower non-manual” group. This group largely comprises 
lower level service workers (such as chefs, bus drivers, hairdressers) and 
accounts for just under 10 per cent of the population. It has not been 
previously identified as ‘disadvantaged’ in terms of educational participation, 
but the study shows that young people from this socio-economic group are 
poorly placed in terms of college participation and are also the only social 
group to have seen a fall in levels of college entry over time. The study 
analysed the factors shaping entry or non-entry to college, using a combined 
analysis of 10 years of School Leavers’ Survey data and in-depth life-history 
interviews with school leavers whose parent(s) were employed in such non-
manual jobs.  
 
 Many of those who enter college reported positive orientations towards, and 
experiences of, their initial education – most simply they placed a value on 
education. Among those that do not go to college, this research identifies some 
important issues around self-belief and aspirations with young people typically 
stating that college ‘is not for me’. While these beliefs to some extent stemmed 
from a more short-term orientation and a necessary priority on earning money 
in these families, they also reflected the nature of their previous educational 
experiences at second level. The findings pointed to a greater risk of 
disengagement from school among this group of young people who reported 
skipping school, lack of motivation and misbehaviour which fed into a 
negative cycle of interaction with teachers. Moreover this group of young 
people felt that they had been treated unfairly by their teachers and perceived 
that their teachers held low expectations for them. Going to college was 
perceived as an extension of school for this non-manual group and hence to be 
School 
Experiences 
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avoided. Low levels of school completion and poor performance in the 
Leaving Certificate examination among this group were the result of these 
often negative school experiences, meaning large numbers were ineligible for 
college. However, even among those who were eligible, this group were the 
group least likely to apply for a college place. 
 
 This research highlights how the availability of information and advice on 
college is another key factor in the decision to go to college. In many ways, this 
group of young people were far more reliant on the advice and support from 
their school in making college decisions, since few had parents with experience 
of college and their siblings and peers were also not generally familiar with the 
college ‘process’. However, findings show that for the lower non-manual group 
career guidance was variously absent, only focused on certain groups of 
students (such as the ‘honours’ class), narrowly focused or directed them away 
from college altogether.  Some young people felt they would have liked more 
help in evaluating the range of post-school options, rather than just receiving 
information.  
Information 
and Advice 
 
 Financial issues also influenced the post-school choices of this group of 
school leavers. For some, the financial commitment to study was perceived as 
too great or would exert too much hardship for themselves and their families. 
Many felt that they would not have been eligible for financial support (and in 
fact this group saw the sharpest fall-off in grant receipt levels over time), or if 
eligible, they felt the support would not have been adequate. Again there was 
evidence of insufficient information and understanding of the system of 
financial supports and the costs entailed in going to college. The research also 
found that perceived financial barriers also framed the aspirations of these 
young people and, among those who were eligible to apply to college, 
perceived financial barriers often shaped that final decision not to attend.  
Financial 
Constraints 
 
The study also pointed to the importance of focusing not only on college 
entry and supporting students in that regard, but also on supporting young 
people through their college lives. Levels of dropout from college during the 
first 18 months were found to vary dramatically across socio-economic groups. 
It is clear that, alongside initiatives promoting college entry, support for young 
people to fully participate in both the academic and non-academic aspects of 
college life is important. Ongoing monitoring of the relative position of this 
lower non-manual group both in terms of college entry and completion will 
also be important. Recent economic conditions are likely to further restrict the 
ability of these and other students to fund their studies through part-time 
employment. The current economic situation is also likely to curtail the ability 
of their parents, situated in vulnerable economic sectors, to support their 
children through college and increase the pressure on these young people to 
seek employment. 
 
†MCCOY, S., D. BYRNE, P.J. O’CONNELL, E. KELLY and C. 
DOHERTY, 2010. Hidden Disadvantage? A Study on the Low Participation 
in Higher Education by the Non-Manual Group, Dublin: Higher Education 
Authority. 
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